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Outsourcing Fraud Detection: The Analyst as 
Dodd-Frank Whistleblower 
Abstract 
The Dodd-Frank Act ushers in a new era of whistleblower law. Congress, for the first 
time, is rewarding the providers of “independent analysis” that helps the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) prosecute fraud. To receive a bounty under section 
922(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act, “independent knowledge” of fraud is not required. 
While the statute recognizes the importance of securities analysts in identifying viola-
tions, the rules interpreting this language fall short in considering and accounting for 
the costs to whistleblowers in the financial services industry. 
This Article first argues that if SEC bounties are intended to compensate whistleb-
lowers, the SEC’s decisions as to the size of the bounty should reflect not only the intrin-
sic value of the information to the SEC, but also the whistleblower’s cost of providing 
that information. Specifically, Rule 21F-6, which allows the SEC to consider whistleb-
lower costs in determining the size of the award, should be changed to require the SEC 
to consider those costs. 
Second, this Article considers the recent economic research about whistleblowers 
and concludes that the SEC cannot afford to discourage hedge fund managers and other 
buy side analysts from participating in the SEC program. To avoid that outcome, the 
SEC should allow these actors to “double-dip,” or collect bounties despite profiting on 
short positions. Finally, the SEC should clarify when “independent analysis” qualifies 
for a bounty. 
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I.  Introduction 
Bernard Madoff’s Ponzi scheme and the scandals that arose during the 
2008–2009 financial crisis exposed weaknesses in the financial regulatory system.1 
The market crash, followed by the scathing testimony of derivatives expert Harry 
Markopolos2 about his nearly decade long effort to alert the government about Ma-
                                                                
 1.  Statement by Timothy F. Geithner, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, before the Committee on Financial 
Services U.S. House of Representatives 7–8 (Mar. 26, 2009), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing 
/financialsvcs_dem/geithner032609.pdf. 
 2. Harry M. Markopolos, CFA, was the 2002–2003 President of the Boston Security Analysts Society. Past 
Presidents, BOSTON SEC. ANALYSTS SOC’Y, http://www.bsas.org/BSAS_About/A03.asp (last visited Mar. 6, 2011). 
Membership in the Society currently includes 5,325 investment professionals. Demographics, BOSTON SEC. 
ANALYSTS SOC’Y, http://www.bsas.org/BSAS_Membership/Mship03.asp (last visited May 1, 2011). “BSAS is a 
founding society of the CFA Institute which has over 90,000 members globally.” Id. According to the CFA Insti-
tute website, there are currently 103,712 CFA Institute members globally. Constituent Statistics, CFA INST., 
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doff, publicly embarrassed the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).3 These 
events spurred the most significant financial reform since the Great Depression.4 
Congress realized that parts of the regulatory structure, including the SEC En-
forcement Division and examiners within the Office of Compliance Inspections and 
Examinations (OCIE)5 and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA),6 
need help in identifying financial fraud.7 If history is any guide, SEC officials will 
have a difficult time keeping up with innovative fraud.8 The government’s decision 
to expand financial compensation for whistleblowers amounts to an admission that 
it needs help.9 Since Congress passed the first federal securities laws in 1933 and 
                                                                                                                                                    
http://www.cfainstitute.org/ethics/conduct/Pages/about_pcs.aspx (last visited May 27, 2011). Of those, 92,953 
are CFA charterholders. Id. 
 3. See Madoff Ponzi Scheme: Hearing Before the  H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 10 (2009) (state-
ment of Harry Markopolos, CFA, CFE), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources 
/documents/MarkopolosTestimony20090203.pdf; see also Nancy Pelosi, Markopolos: I Gift Wrapped and Deli-
vered the Largest Ponzi Scheme in History to the SEC, YOUTUBE (Feb. 4, 2009), http://www.youtube.com 
/watch?v=uw_Tgu0txS0 (video recording of C-Span 3 live broadcast of Harry Markopolos testimony to U.S. 
House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services); 60 Minutes: The Man Who Knew, (CBS television 
broadcast June 14, 2009), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=5088137n&tag=mncol;lst;2. 
 4. See Damian Paletta & Aaron Lucchetti, Law Remakes U.S. Financial Landscape, WALL ST. J., July 16, 
2010, at A1 (describing the Act as “the biggest expansion of government power over banking and markets since 
the Depression.”); see also U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, In Brief FY 2011 Congressional Justification 
2 (Feb. 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secfy11congbudgjust.pdf (“The financial crisis that began 
in 2008 and continues to resonate through the markets today is . . . the most serious economic and regulatory 
crisis this country has faced since the Great Depression.”). 
 5. The OCIE is the SEC’s exam arm for broker-dealers, transfer agents, investment advisers, investment 
companies, the national securities exchanges, clearing agencies, the nationally recognized statistical rating or-
ganizations (NRSROs), self-regulatory organizations (SROs) such as the Financial Industry Regulatory Authori-
ty (FINRA) and the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB), and the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (PCAOB). Office of Compliance, Inspections, and Examinations, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie.shtml (last modified Feb. 12, 2011). It is important to note that the OCIE 
does not examine issuers. See id. 
 6. FINRA conducts many, if not most broker-dealer exams. See About the Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority, FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2011) (“FINRA 
oversees nearly 4,570 brokerage firms, about 163,325 branch offices and approximately 630,850 registered se-
curities representatives.”). 
 7. See 156 CONG. REC. S4066 (daily ed. May 20, 2010) (Statement of Sen. Kaufman) (“Whistleblowers 
provide a vital early warning system to detect and expose fraud in the financial system. With the right protec-
tions, whistleblowers can help root out the kinds of massive Wall Street fraud that contributed to the current 
financial crisis.”). 
 8. See generally HARRY MARKOPOLOS, NO ONE WOULD LISTEN: A TRUE FINANCIAL THRILLER (2010); see 
also H. DAVID KOTZ, INVESTIGATION OF FAILURE OF THE SEC TO UNCOVER BERNARD MADOFF’S PONZI SCHEME 
457 (2009). 
 9. See Statement of Sen. Kaufman, supra note 7. Between fiscal years 2005 and 2007, the SEC budget 
stayed flat or declined, and the agency lost 10 percent of its employees. FY 2011 Congressional Justification, supra 
note 4, at 2. This hampered several key areas including enforcement and examination programs. Id. 
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1934, the industry has become vastly more complex.10 The industry “has not merely 
mushroomed; it has exploded in size, scope and globality.”11 And, in less than a gen-
eration, the number of equity issues outstanding has grown from about three to 
over seven thousand.12 The SEC currently oversees more than thirty-five thousand 
registrants, including ten thousand public companies, seventy-eight hundred mu-
tual funds, fifty-four hundred broker-dealers, and six hundred transfer agents.13 
One of Markopolos’s key recommendations for dealing with the complexity is for 
the SEC to hire experienced brokers, traders, and back-office personnel to conduct 
investigations.14 “Let lawyers prosecute, not investigate,” he says.15 
But should the SEC hire experts from the industry to identify fraud, or should 
it outsource this function?16 On July 21, 2010, Congress answered that question 
when President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”), which included a new kind of whistleblower 
program.17 
The clear legislative intent of the program is to “create incentives to report 
wrongdoing and protect whistleblowers.”18 But who should be rewarded for blowing 
the whistle? As noted earlier, due to limited resources, OCIE and FINRA examiners 
cannot give full attention to the complete range of regulated entities.19 On the other 
                                                                
 10. Cornelius Hurley, Paying the Price for Too Big to Fail, 4 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 351, 352–56 (2010) 
(discussing the increasing complexity in the financial services industry). 
 11. Clark Winter, Tuesdays with Bernie—Some Life (and Investing) Lessons from the Madoff Affair (2009), 
http://www.clarkwinter.com/wr tings_tuesdayswithbernie.php. 
 12. Id. 
 13. FY 2011 Congressional Justification, supra note 4, at 2. 
 14. MARKOPOLOS, supra note 8, at 269–70. 
 15. Id. at 269. 
 16. Although some agencies have successfully outsourced core functions to concerned citizens, see e.g., 
LCDR Michael Billeaudeaux, The Citizen’s Action Network: How the U.S. Coast Guard Put the “Home” in Ho-
meland Security, PROCEEDINGS, Spring 2009, at 33, available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/spring 
2009/spring2009.pdf (The U.S. Coast Guard, for example, uses a “Citizen’s Action Network” to monitor the 
coastline.), unrestricted private enforcement of the securities laws under Rule 10b-5 rarely results in optimal 
deterrence. See Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the Relationship Between 
Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10B-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1303–05 (2008) (“Law and economics 
scholarship teaches that it is especially difficult to achieve optimal deterrence when private parties are granted 
the right to enforce overbroad liability rules for financial reward.”). 
 17. Dodd-Frank Financial Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 
(2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act]. 
 18. Shruti Shah & Robert N. Walton, The SEC’s Tricky Balancing Act, FCPA BLOG (Nov. 8, 2010, 7:28 AM), 
http://fcpablog.squarespace.com/blog/2010/11/8/the-secs-tricky-balancing-act.html. 
 19. Louis A. Aguilar, Commissioner, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, A Shared Responsibility: Preserving the Fidu-
ciary Standard (Mar. 26, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch032610laa.htm (“Clearly, OCIE has 
been seriously challenged over the last decade—a time during which the number of regulated entities grew sig-
nificantly, while OCIE faced declining staff and budgets.”); Lori Richards, Director, Office of Compliance In-
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hand, securities analysts taken together can follow more entities: each analyst can 
focus his practice narrowly, leading to increased specialization. Examiners also may 
not know where to look for fraud within each of the entities they investigate.20 Even 
if the examiners know where to look, they may not have the expertise necessary to 
interpret the data as suspicious.21 They may lack the formal financial training that 
analysts often possess. 
In determining which groups to rely upon, the SEC can consider the difference 
between “general” and “firm specific” knowledge about how to detect fraud.22 To 
increase its level of “general” expertise, OCIE could hire examiners that are more 
competent. These examiners would be less likely to miss relatively easy cases where 
specialized expertise is not required. But when access to highly specialized “specific” 
financial expertise is required, the SEC will likely need to depend on experienced 
and sophisticated securities professionals. By providing financial incentives to out-
siders with unique skills, the SEC could access and analyze valuable information 
about fraud more efficiently. With superior information, the SEC would be able to 
better deploy its examiners and enforcement attorneys. 
Some functions cannot be outsourced. The Enforcement Division of the SEC 
needs attorneys to prosecute cases.23 However, investment analysts and other fraud 
                                                                                                                                                    
spections and Examinations, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech by SEC Staff: Frequently-Asked Questions About 
SEC Examinations,  (Jan. 17, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/ spch011708lar.htm (“In our work 
as examiners, we are challenged by oversight of 5,800 broker-dealers (with more than 173,000 branch offices!), 
almost 11,000 investment advisers, and about 950 mutual fund complexes with more than 8,000 portfolios, and 
450 transfer agents. . . . [G]overnment resources are lim ted, [and] we cannot examine every firm, every branch 
office, or every issue.”). See accompanying text at supra notes 12–13 for the updated numbers. 
 20. Common sense dictates that if OCIE could detect fraud effectively, the SEC would not need to reward 
whistleblowers. Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie.shtml (last modified Feb. 14, 2011) (“OCIE’s mission is to protect inves-
tors, ensure market integrity and support responsible capital formation through risk-focused strategies that: . . . 
prevent fraud; . . .”). 
 21. See David J. Baum & Maureen Whalen, Back to the Future: Is Disbanding OCIE the Answer?, LAW 360 
(Jan. 5, 2010), http://www.alston.com/files/Publication/bd839511-08d5-48a9-ac91-99a06488804c/Presen ta-
tion/PublicationAttachment/ad3115fb-debb-4ca0-851d-a0d9f5e33286/BackFuture.pdf (arguing for the re-
integration of examiners back into policymaking divisions in order to “immerse them in the subject matter w th 
which they deal during inspections and examinations”). 
 22. Cf. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Specific and General Knowledge, and Organizational 
Structure, at 1, in MICHAEL C. JENSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY (1998), available at 
http://business.illinois.edu/aibrahim/readings/Specific%20and%20General%20Knowledge.pdf (“We define 
specific knowledge as knowledge that is costly to transfer among agents and general knowledge as knowledge that 
is inexpensive to transmit. Because it is costly to transfer, getting specific knowledge used in decision-making 
requires decentralizing many decision rights in both the economy and in firms.”). 
 23. About the Division of Enforcement, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/ en-
force/about.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2011). 
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detection specialists24 that the SEC could hire to detect fraud might not only lack the 
specialized knowledge of their peers in the industry, they may lack motivating fi-
nancial incentives. Although hiring experts can help the SEC in some areas,25 it is 
often better for the SEC to work with experts on the outside. Financial rewards for 
government employees are difficult to assign and disburse.26 SEC officials are public 
servants.27 Thus, it would be politically impossible to lavishly reward SEC officials 
for doing their jobs well.28 And it would seem to make sense to outsource a consi-
derable part of the fraud identification apparatus to expert whistleblowers. 
However, regulators must ensure that the benefits of whistleblower incentives 
exceed any negative consequences. Part II of this Article will outline the statutory 
whistleblower program and Rule 21F (“Rule 21F” or “the Rule,”), which governs its 
implementation.29 Part III will analyze whistleblower incentives, define the term 
“whistleblower,” and examine the factors that drive whistleblowing.30 It will then 
explain why financial incentives are more effective than non-financial incentives.31 
Part IV will examine the consequences analysts suffer when they blow the whistle, 
and argue that the SEC should encourage analysts (especially on the buy side)32 to 
                                                                
 24. Perhaps the best known professional designation for fraud detection specialists is the Chartered Fraud 
Examiner designation. See Become a CFE, ASS’N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS, 
http://www.acfe.com/membership/becoming-cfe.asp (last visited Mar. 5, 2011) (“Globally preferred by employ-
ers, the Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE) credential denotes proven expertise in fraud prevention, detection, and 
deterrence.”). 
 25. See, e.g., Zachary A. Goldfarb, At SEC, an Unconventional New Team; Agency Hiring More Experts, Pro-
fessionals to Help Assess Complex Financial Systems, WASH. POST, June 15, 2010, at A10 (stating that the SEC 
hired a nuclear physicist to draw conclusions from “chaotic information”). 
 26. HOWARD RISHER & CHARLES H. FAY, NEW STRATEGIES FOR PUBLIC PAY: RETHINKING GOVERNMENT 
COMPENSATION PROGRAMS 1 (1997) (describing the growing consensus that compensation programs for public 
sector employees do not work and hinder reinvention of government). 
 27. Luis A. Aguilar, Commissioner, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech by SEC Commissioner: Answering the 
Call to Public Service on Behalf of Investors (Feb. 22, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/ 
spch022210laa.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2011). 
 28. SEC employees are already among the highest paid in federal government. Danielle Kurtzleben, The 
Top Paid Federal Employees, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT (Nov. 30, 2010), 
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2010/11/30/the-top-paid-federal-employees (according to the U.S. Office 
of Personnel Management, the average SEC employee earns $147,475 per year; the average federal civilian em-
ployee earns $74,311). 
 29. See infra Part II. 
 30. See infra Parts III.A–B. 
 31. See infra Parts III.C–D. 
 32. Buy Side, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/buyside.asp (last visited Apr. 13, 2011) 
(The “buy side” is “[t]he side of Wall Street comprising the investing institutions such as mutual funds, pension 
funds and insurance firms that tend to buy large portions of securities for money-management purposes. The 
buy side is the opposite of the sell side ent ties, which provide recommendations for upgrades, downgrades, 
target prices and opinions to the public market. Together, the buy side and sell side make up both sides of Wall 
Street.”). For reasons given below in the last paragraph of section III, infra, this author believes that the SEC 
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participate in the program by not penalizing them for “double-dipping” by taking a 
short position and then seeking a bounty.33 Part V will conclude briefly. 
II.  The SEC Whistleblower Program 
A.  The Statute 
Section 922(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act, to be codified at section 21F of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), provides that: 
In any covered judicial or administrative action, or related action, the 
[SEC], under regulations prescribed by the [SEC] . . . shall pay an award 
or awards to 1 or more whistleblowers who voluntarily provided original 
information to the [SEC] that led to the successful enforcement of the 
covered judicial or administrative action, or related action, in an aggregate 
amount equal to—(A) not less than 10 percent, in total, of what has been 
collected of the monetary sanctions imposed in the action or related ac-
tions; and (B) not more than 30 percent [of the same].34 
Section 922(a) defines a “covered judicial or administrative action” as “any 
judicial or administrative action brought by the [SEC] under the securities laws that 
results in monetary sanctions exceeding $1,000,000.”35 
Section 922(a) marks the first time the SEC has offered financial incentives to 
whistleblowers for information leading to the successful enforcement of securities 
law violations other than insider trading.36 Before Dodd-Frank, the Insider Trading 
and Securities Fraud Act of 1988 (“Insider Trading Act of 1988” or “1988 Act”) 
permitted the SEC to reward individuals who provided the SEC with information 
on insider trading.37 But the SEC made few awards. Prior to a July 23, 2010 award 
for $1,000,000, the SEC had “awarded a total of $160,000 to five claimants in the 
                                                                                                                                                    
should be cognizant that buy side analysts will be more likely to provide viable leads than their sell side coun-
terparts. 
 33. See infra Part IV. 
 34. Dodd-Frank Act § 922(a), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1842 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78u-6(b)(1)). For a discussion of the term “whistleblower,” see infra Part III.A. 
 35. Dodd-Frank Act § 922(a). 
 36. See Phyllis Diamond, Regulatory Reform: Whistleblower Bounty Provision Will Have Large Impact, 
Washington Lawyer Predicts, BNA SEC. LAW DAILY, Sept. 21, 2010. Section 922(a) provides for awarding boun-
ties for information about violations of “the securities laws.” Dodd-Frank Act § 922(a). The “securities laws” 
include the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, The 
Investment Company Act of 1940, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and, 
presumably, the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010. See The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last visited Mar. 5, 2011). 
 37. The 1988 Act expanded on the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 
1264. 
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twenty years since it received the statutory authority to award bounties in insider 
trading cases.”38 Indeed, on March 29, 2010, the SEC Inspector General had issued a 
report criticizing the SEC for making too few bounty awards.39 
Also, section 922(a), unlike the Insider Trading Act of 1988, guarantees a boun-
ty for eligible whistleblowers.40 And it says that the bounty shall be “not less than 10 
percent” of the money recovered.41 Although the SEC retains discretion to award 
less than 10 percent to a particular whistleblower in cases where information lead-
ing to a single enforcement action comes from multiple original sources (“the 
[SEC] . . . shall pay an award . . . to 1 or more whistleblowers”),42 it is significant that 
Congress set a floor. The “award” can never be less than $100,000, whether shared 
between multiple whistleblowers or not.43 By contrast, the Insider Trading Act of 
1988 only provided for a bounty “not to exceed 10 percent,”44 meaning that the SEC 
has discretion not to award a bounty at all, even when the whistleblower technically 
qualifies.45 
Moreover, the bounty in section 922(a) is calculated from “monetary sanc-
tions,” defined as including “any monies, including penalties, disgorgement[s] and 
interest,”46 and “any monies deposited into a disgorgement fund . . . pursuant to 
section 308(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.”47 Under the Insider Trading Act 
of 1988, the bounty was calculated from penalties imposed and recovered by the 
SEC or Attorney General.48 Under the 1988 Act, all discretion as to whether or not 
to award a bounty remained with the SEC.49 Thus, section 922(a) describes the eli-
gible monetary sanctions from which the bounty can be calculated in more sweep-
                                                                
 38. U.S. SEC Awards $1 Million Bounty for Information Leading to an Insider Trading Action, GIBSON DUNN 
(July 27, 2010), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/SECAwards1MillionDollarBounty-
InsiderTradingAction.aspx (stating that the SEC paid a $1,000,000 bounty for information leading to the May 
2010 action against Pequot Capital Management, Inc. (“Pequot”), its chairman and CEO, Arthur J. Samberg, 
and David Zilkha, an employee of Microsoft and later, Pequot.). 
 39. OFFICE OF AUDITS, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT NO. 474, ASSESSMENT OF THE SEC’S BOUNTY 
PROGRAM (2010), available at http://www.sec-oig.gov/reports/auditsinspections/2010/474.pdf 
 40. Dodd-Frank Act § 922(a). 
 41. Id.  
 42. Id.  (emphasis added). 
 43. Id.  
 44. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(e) (2006). The Dodd-Frank Act struck this section from the Code. Dodd-Frank Act 
§ 923(b)(2)(B). 
 45. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(e) (2006). 
 46. Dodd-Frank Act § 922(a). 
 47. Id. (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(4)(B)). 
 48. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(e) (2006). The Dodd-Frank Act struck this section from the Code. Dodd-Frank 
Act § 923(b)(2)(B). 
 49. Application for Bounty Awards on Civil Penalties Imposed in Insider Trading Litigation, Exchange Act 
Release No. 26,994, 43 SEC Docket 1964 (June 30, 1989). 
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ing terms than its statutory predecessor.50 One consequence of the expansive lan-
guage is that under section 922(a), part of the whistleblower’s award is carved out 
from the amounts collected to compensate fraud victims.51 
Finally, if the SEC determines that the whistleblower is eligible for an award, 
the agency must decide the size of the award within the boundaries of the statute 
and implementing Rule.52 Section 922(a) requires that the SEC consider the follow-
ing factors: 
(I) [T]he significance of the information provided by the whistleb-
lower to the success of the covered judicial or administrative action; (II) 
the degree of assistance provided by the whistleblower and any legal rep-
resentative of the whistleblower in a covered judicial or administrative ac-
tion; (III) the programmatic interest of the [SEC] in deterring violations 
of the securities laws by making awards to whistleblowers who provide in-
formation that lead to the successful enforcement of such laws; and (IV) 
such additional relevant factors as the [SEC] may establish by rule or 
regulation. . . .53 
Unfortunately, these statutory factors do not consider the costs to whistleblow-
ers and the dangers they face.54 Congress, in enacting the statute, appeared focused 
on the value of the information provided, while ignoring the costs. For instance, 
under the Dodd-Frank Act, the benchmark from which the SEC will calculate a 
whistleblower’s reward is the agency’s monetary recovery.55 Thus, if the SEC does 
                                                                
 50. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(e) (2006) (calculation of eligible bounty from monetary sanctions collected 
from penalties), with Dodd-Frank Act § 922(a) (calculation of eligible bounty from monies including penalties, 
interest, and disgorgement). 
 51. Under section 308 of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, civil penalties are added to a fund for the benefit 
of fraud victims. 15 U.S.C. § 7246(a) (2006). The language of section 922(a) includes these funds in the term 
“monetary sanctions” eligible to calculate a bounty. Dodd-Frank Act § 922(a). Matthew Lee, former Senior Vice 
President Financial Control for Lehman Brothers and Repo 105 whistleblower, argues that “the prime purpose 
of whistle blowing is to protect the Public from loss.” Letter from Matthew Lee, Former Senior Vice President 
Financial Control, Lehman Brother, to Sec. & Exch. Comm’n. (Dec. 13, 2010), 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-119.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2011).   If protecting the public 
from public loss is the highest priority, then one must be careful not to give whistleblowers windfalls at the ex-
pense of fraud victims. For an explanation of Repo 105, see infra note 279. 
 52. See Dodd-Frank Act § 922(a); see also infra Part II.B.2. 
 53. Dodd-Frank Act § 922(a). 
 54. It did, however, occur to the SEC to consider costs to whistleblowers. Proposed Rule 21F-6 includes 
eleven “permissible factors” the SEC may consider in determining the size of the award. Proposed Rules, infra 
note 61, at 70,499–500. One of these factors is whether the whistleblower experienced “[a]ny unique hardships 
experienced by the whistleblower as a result of his or her reporting and assisting in the enforcement action.” Id. 
at 70,500. Unfortunately, because of the SEC’s characterization of this factor as merely a “permissible” factor, 
the SEC is not required to consider it. See id. 
 55. See Dodd-Frank Act § 922(a). 
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not recover money, then the whistleblower receives nothing, even though she may 
have taken a costly risk in sharing her “original information” with the SEC.56 This 
problem is acute when the SEC uses the whistleblower’s information to obtain 
equitable relief, such as an injunction or a declaration, but fails to recover any 
funds.57 The Dodd-Frank Act leaves the whistleblower completely unrewarded in 
this situation, reducing the effectiveness of the program.58 
A better approach would be for the SEC to always base a bounty on both the 
information’s value to the SEC and the costs to the whistleblower. When the costs 
to the whistleblower are high, the bounty would be higher. And when the costs are 
low, as would be the case if the SEC responded immediately to the whistleblower’s 
concerns, the bounty would be lower. Ultimately, if financial incentives are in-
tended to offset costs to the whistleblower, the SEC should consider them when de-
ciding the size of the award.59 
B.  Rule 21F60 
To understand the whistleblower program, it is essential to take into account the 
rules for implementing section 922(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act.61 To be credible in 
the Dodd-Frank era, the SEC must exercise discretion in a reasonable manner. If 
the SEC fails to pay sufficient bounties to deserving whistleblowers, or if it fails to 
award bounties consistently in similar cases or unreasonably discriminates against 
                                                                
 56. Lori Pizzani, Blowing It, CFA MAG., Jan.–Feb. 2011, at 32, 35–37. 
 57. See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text (discussing the SEC’s reluctance under the Insider Trad-
ing Act of 1988 to make monetary awards, which totaled only $160,000 in the more than twenty years following 
passage of the bill, notwithstanding a $1,000,000 award in 2010). 
 58. See Pizzani, supra note 56, at 36–37. From an economics perspective, that might not be a bad result. 
Arguably, the value of the information to the SEC is zero when no monetary sanction is recovered. However, 
the information does have value because it enables the SEC to bring enforcement actions and enjoin securities 
violations. See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Proposes New Whistleblower Program Under Dodd-
Frank Act (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-213.htm. 
 59. In deciding how to measure costs to whistleblowers, the SEC could study the methodology Kenneth 
Feinberg used to compensate the victims of the 9/11 World Trade Center attacks. See Brendan I. Koerner, How 
Are 9/11 Victims Paid, SLATE (Dec. 23, 2003, 6:17 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2093166/ for a description of 
that methodology. 
 60. The SEC issued final Rule 21F just a few days before this Article went to print. The issuance of the final 
Rule does not change the analysis or thesis of this Article.  
 61. Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
Exchange Act Release No. 64545, http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/34-64545.pdf (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pts. 240, 249) (May 25, 2011) [hereinafter Final Rules]; see also Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleb-
lower Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 63237, 75 
Fed. Reg. 70,488 (Nov. 3, 2010) [hereinafter Proposed Rules]. This section does not pretend to summarize Rule 
21F in all its aspects. Rather, it focuses on the elements of the rule that will likely to be of greatest concern to 
analyst whistleblowers. 
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certain groups, the agency could lose credibility. However, if the SEC manages the 
program evenhandedly, it will gain in influence and effectiveness. 
1.  Payment of a Bounty 
The incentive structures of the whistleblower program are complex.62 Rule 21F de-
fines who qualifies as a whistleblower eligible for an award.63 Most fundamentally, 
the whistleblower must provide “original information.”64 Rule 21F-4(b)(1) defines 
“original information” as information derived from the whistleblower’s indepen-
dent knowledge or analysis; is not already known to the SEC from any other source, 
unless the whistleblower is the original source of the information; is not exclusively 
derived from an allegation made in a judicial or administrative hearing, in a gov-
ernment report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media, unless the 
whistleblower is a source of the information; and is provided to the SEC for the first 
time after July 21, 2010 (the date of enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act).65 
Paragraph (2) of Rule 21F-4(b) defines “independent knowledge” as “factual 
information in the whistleblower’s possession that is not obtained from publicly 
available sources.”66 Publicly available sources include “both sources that are widely 
disseminated . . . and sources that, though not widely disseminated, are generally 
available to the public . . . .”67 Significantly, the definition of “independent know-
ledge” does not require “direct, first-hand knowledge of potential violations.”68 
Thus, under Rule 21F-4(b)(2), a whistleblower could qualify as having “indepen-
dent knowledge” even if she obtained it “from any of [her] experiences, observa-
tions, or communications . . . .”69 However, a whistleblower who only reports mere 
                                                                
 62. See generally Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative Effectiveness of Re-
wards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1151, 1157–73 (2010) (arguing it 
is possible to break down the incentives governments inject into their regulatory structures into three catego-
ries: anti-retaliation protections, affirmative reporting duties and liability for failure to report, and monetary 
incentives). 
 63. See Final Rules, supra note 61, at 7–203; see also Proposed Rules, supra note 61, at 70,489. 
 64. Proposed Rules, supra note 61, at 70,491–92 (Proposed Rule 21F-4(b)). For the statutory language, see 
Dodd-Frank Act § 922(a), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 123 Stat. 1376, 1841–42 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78u-6(a)(3)(B)). 
 65. Final Rules, supra note 61, at 39. “The first three requirements recited the definition of “original infor-
mation” found in Section 21F(a)(3) of the Exchange Act.” Id. at 39–40. Rule 21F-4(b)(1) is adopted as pro-
posed. Id. at 41; see also Proposed Rules, supra note 61, at 70,491. 
 66. Final Rules, supra note 61, at 43–44. Rule 21F-4(b)(2) is adopted as proposed. Id. at 43; see also Pro-
posed Rules, supra note 61, at 70,492. 
 67. Final Rules, supra note 61, at 44, 46. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. The definition for independent knowledge “is subject to the exclusion for knowledge from public 
sources, and subject further to the exclusions set forth in Rule 21F-4(b)(4). Id. 
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“factual information” contained in public SEC filings would not be deemed to have 
“independent knowledge.”70 
Under section 922(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act, the whistleblower’s “independent 
analysis” can be original information.71 Rule 21F-4(b)(3) defines ‘independent anal-
ysis’ to mean the whistleblower’s “own examination and evaluation of information 
that may be generally available, but which reveals information that is not generally 
known or available to the public.”72 The SEC further stated that “there are circums-
tances where individuals can review publicly available information, and, through 
their additional evaluation and analysis, provide vital assistance to the [SEC] staff in 
understanding complex schemes and identifying securities violations.”73 Informa-
tion gathered from public sources can often be analyzed in a new way. The In re 
Merck & Co., Inc. Securities Litigation74 case, discussed below in Part IV.C, illustrates 
this point.75 
For public policy reasons, Rule 21F-4(b)(4) provides six exclusions where in-
formation cannot qualify as original information.76 The exclusions that apply to at-
torneys,77 certain responsible personnel, compliance officers, and independent pub-
                                                                
 70. See Final Rules, supra note 61, at 44, 46; see also Filings & Forms, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml (last visited Apr. 19, 2011) (“All companies, foreign and domestic, are required 
to file registration statements, periodic reports, and other forms electronically through EDGAR. Anyone can 
access and download this information for free.”). 
 71. Dodd-Frank Act § 922(a). 
 72. Final Rules, supra note 61, at 48; see also Proposed Rules, supra note 61, at 70,492. “Independent analysis 
means your own analysis, whether done alone or in combination with others.” Final Rules, supra note 61, at 
248. Rule 21F-4(b)(3) is adopted as proposed, “with a slight modification to clarify that ‘independent analysis’ 
can be based upon the whistleblower’s evaluation of publicly ava lable sources.” Id. at 50. The final Rule clarifies 
that an award “will primarily depend . . . on an evaluation of whether the analysis is of such high quality that it 
either causes the staff to open an investigation, or significantly contributes to a successful enforcement action.” 
Id. See infra notes 260–90 and accompanying text for a discussion of agency problems. 
 73. Final Rules, supra note 61, at 48; see also Proposed Rules, supra note 61, at 70,492. 
 74. 432 F.3d 261 (3d Cir. 2005).  
 75. See infra Part IV.C. 
 76. Final Rules, supra note 61, at 53 (the exclusions are set forth in Rules 21F-4(b)(4)(i–vi)). The exclusions 
were an area of significant revision from the proposed rules. See id. 
 77. Proposed Rules 21F-4(b)(4)(i–ii) are adopted with several modifications. Final Rules, supra note 61, at 
59–60 (“First, we have modified the language to clarify that both exclusions apply to non-attorneys . . . . Second, 
we have modified [the second exclusion] to clarify that it applies to attorneys who work in-house for an entity 
and provide legal services”); see also Proposed Rules, supra note 61, at 70,492–93 (“The first proposed exclusion 
is for information that was obtained through a communication that is subject to the attorney-client privilege. . . 
. The second [proposed] exclusion applies when a would-be whistleblower obtains information as a result of the 
legal representation of a client on whose behalf the whistleblower’s services . . . have been retained, and the per-
son seeks to make a whistleblower submission for his or her own benefit. . . .”). 
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lic accountants,78 are “narrowly-focused, and promote the goal of ensuring that the 
persons most responsible for an entity’s conduct and compliance with law are not 
incentivized to promote their own self-interest at the possible expense of the entity’s 
ability to detect, address, and self-report violations.”79 As adopted, the Rule “per-
mits such individuals to become whistleblowers under certain circumstances.”80  
In its exclusions, the SEC is responding to corporate concerns that the law would 
undermine anonymous hotlines set up under the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act to en-
courage internal reporting of wrongdoing.81 Companies worry that whistleblowers 
will bypass those programs and report directly to the SEC.82 Under the proposed 
rules, the exclusions are broad and would cease to apply if the entity fails to disclose 
the information received from the whistleblower to the SEC within a “reasonable 
                                                                
 78. The proposed rules covering responsible personnel, compliance officers, and independent public ac-
countants proposed exclusions that would made it difficult for these employees to collect awards. Proposed 
Rules, supra note 61, at 70,493–94. Under the proposed rules, employees for an entity with legal, compliance, 
audit, supervisory or governance responsibility, and persons who receive information from those employees, 
were excluded from receiving an award “unless the entity does not disclose the information to the [SEC] within 
a reasonable time or if the entity proceeds in bad faith,” Id. at 70,493. The final Rule significantly revised the 
proposed rule to create a better balance and make it possible for some of these employees to receive an award 
under certain circumstances. Final Rules, supra note 61, at 53; see id. at 69 (“we do not think it serves the pur-
pose of Section 21F to apply this principle in a manner that creates expansive new exclusions for broad catego-
ries of company personnel”); see also infra notes 88–92 and accompanying text (creating exceptions to the ex-
clusions).  
 79. Final Rules, supra note 61, at 54–55. 
 80.  See supra note 78; see also infra notes 88–92 and accompanying text. 
 81.  Jessica Holzer & Ashby Jones, SEC Proposes Rules for Bounties, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 2010, at B4.  
 82. Bruce Carton, Pitfalls Emerge in Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Bounty Provision, SEC. DOCKET (Sept. 9, 
2010, 3:37 PM), http://www.securitiesdocket.com/2010/09/09/pitfalls-emerge-in-dodd-frank-whistleblower-
bounty-provision/ (“Most often heard is the complaint that the law provides a huge incentive for employees to 
race to the SEC’s door, so they can be the first to provide the agency with ‘original information’ leading to an 
enforcement action.”); Steve Quinlivan, SEC’s Proposed Whistleblower Rules—The Good, Bad and Ugly, DODD-
FRANK.COM (Nov. 3, 2010), http://dodd-frank.com/sec%E2%80%99s-proposed-whistleblower-
rules%E2%80%94the-good-bad-and-ugly/ (“The concern is employees will run to the SEC to report violations 
instead of advising the employer of the misconduct and permitting the employer to take appropriate action.”). 
However, according to whistleblower attorney Eric Havian (and this author agrees), “the internal reporting 
argument is bogus.” Melanie Rodier, Wall Street Fights New Whistleblower Law, WALL ST. & TECH. (Feb. 11, 
2011), http://www.wallstreetandtech.com/articles/229218465?cid=nl_wallstreettech_daily. According to Havian, 
“[It] is the new corporate line to kill the SEC whistleblower law. And it’s absolutely baseless.”). Id. Another 
whistleblower attorney addressed the internal reporting argument: “The essence of their argument is that big 
corporations can police themselves and provide adequate forums for employees to report wrongdoing. This 
pos tion may be true, for say, a report of an employee who is stealing from the cash register of a big-box store. 
But this does not make sense where the company is following a corporate policy of stealing from consumers or 
cheating shareholders or investors. A corporation simply cannot police itself when its senior officials are the 
culprits.” Reuben Guttman, Fraudsters Lobby to Muzzle Whistleblowers, MARKETWATCH (Feb. 8, 2011, 11:49 
AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/fraudsters-lobby-to-muzzle-whistleblowers-2011-02-08. Nonethe-
less, whether the whistleblower program discourages employees from reporting internally before going to the 
SEC may be a good topic for future research. 
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time” or if it proceeds in “bad faith.”83 The revised rules take a markedly different 
approach. Rules 21F-4(b)(4)(iii)(A–C) identify “by title or function specific catego-
ries of personnel to whom the rules apply.”84 The exclusions apply to officers, direc-
tors, trustees, partners, compliance officers, auditors, and investigators.85 For offic-
ers, directors, trustees, and partners, the Rule applies “whenever one of the desig-
designated persons is “informed . . . of allegations of misconduct,” regardless of 
whether the communication was made “with the reasonable expectation [the reci-
pient] would take steps to cause the entity to respond appropriately to the viola-
tion.”86 Paragraph (D) of Rule 21F-4(b)(4)(iii) “excludes information that is learned 
by employees of . . . a public accounting firm through and audit . . . or other en-
gagement required under the federal securities laws . . . .”87  
Rule 21F-4(b)(4)(v) sets forth three exceptions to the application of Rule 21F-
4(b)(4)(iii).88 Satisfaction of any of these exceptions allows the designated person to 
receive an award.89 The first exception applies “when the designated person has a 
reasonable basis to believe that disclosure of the information to the [SEC] is neces-
sary to prevent . . . substantial injury to the financial interest or property of the enti-
ty or investors.”90 The second exception applies “when the designated person has a 
reasonable basis to believe that the entity is engaging in conduct that will impede an 
investigation of the misconduct.”91 The third exception takes effect after at least 120 
days have elapsed since the whistleblower reported the information to the audit 
committee, chief legal officer, chief compliance officer, or to the whistleblower’s su-
pervisor, if the whistleblower received it under circumstances indicating that the 
relevant person was already aware of the information.92 
Rule 21F-4(b)(iv) as adopted slightly weakens the proposed rule that would 
have excluded from the definition of “independent knowledge” information ob-
tained unlawfully.93 The Rule as adopted modifies the proposed rule by requiring a 
domestic court to determine that the information was obtained in a manner that 
violated applicable state or federal law.94 Likewise, Rule 21F-4(b)(4)(vi) modifies the 
                                                                
      83.   Proposed Rules, supra note 61, at 70,493. 
     84.  Final Rules, supra note 61, at 69–72. 
     85.  Id. 
     86.  Id. at 70.  
     87.  Id. at 72–73.    
     88.  Id. at 73–75.    
     89.  Id. at 73–74. 
     90.  Id. at 74.    
     91.  Id. at 75.    
  92. Id. at 75–77. 
  93. See id. at 79–80. 
  94. Id. 
VOL. 6 NO. 2 2011 301 
proposed rule that would have excluded all information if the whistleblower ob-
tained the information from a person subject to another exclusion.95 The Rule as 
adopted creates an exception to the exclusion: if “the information is not excluded 
from that person’s use,96 or the whistleblower is providing the [SEC] with informa-
tion about potential violations involving that person,” then the whistleblower can 
receive an award.97 
2.  Size of the Bounty 
If the SEC determines that a bounty is due, the agency must determine its size. In 
addition to the mandatory factors Congress set forth in the statute for determining 
the ultimate size of the award within the 10 to 30 percent range,98 Rule 21F-6 allows 
for eleven “permissible considerations” in determining the size of the award.99 For 
our purposes, the most important consideration is the sixth one listed, namely that 
the SEC may consider “any unique hardships experienced by the whistleblower as a 
result of his or her reporting and assisting in the enforcement action.”100  
The Rule gives wholly too much discretion to the SEC. This Article argues that 
because of the undeniable costs that whistleblowers experience,101 and the historical 
failure to compensate for those costs,102 the SEC should always consider costs to 
whistleblowers when considering the size of awards. Further, the word “unique” in 
the phrase “unique hardships” allows the SEC to interpret some grave costs as 
commonplace and therefore not deserving of consideration. 
C.  Reaction  
On May 25, 2011, the SEC issued final Rule 21F103 in a 3-2 vote split along ideologi-
cal lines.104 Whistleblower advocates were pleased, largely because the SEC sided 
                                                                
  95.  Id. at 81. 
 96. This phrase “is intended to be purely derivative; i.e., if the person from whom the information is free to use 
the information in a submission . . . then this rule does not bar use of the information.” Id. at 82. 
  97.  Id. 
 98. See supra note 53 and accompanying text for the statutory factors. For the statutory language giving the 
range of potential awards, see supra note 34 and accompanying text. In addition to the statutory factors, Rule 
21F-6 also requires the SEC to consider “whether an award otherwise enhances the [SEC’s] ability to enforce the 
federal securities laws, protect investors, and encourage the submission of high quality information from whis-
tleblowers.” Final Rules, supra note 61, at 119. 
 99. Final Rules, supra note 61, at 119; Proposed Rules, supra note 61, at 70,499–500. 
 100. Final Rules, supra note 61, at 119; Proposed Rules, supra note 61, at 70,500. 
 101. See infra Part IV.A. 
 102. See infra Part III.C. 
  103. Final Rules, supra note 61. 
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with whistleblowers over business interests on the critical issue of whether corpo-
rate whistleblowers would be required to report internally before reporting to the 
SEC.105 Tom Devine of the Government Accountability Project said: “Yesterday the 
SEC took the high road to strengthen the role of whistleblowers against corporate 
fraud. It rejected demands by a big business ‘fraud lobby’ and House Republicans to 
twist whistleblowing into obstruction of justice.”106 
 On the other side of the spectrum, David Hirschmann of the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce’s Center for Capital Markets said in a statement that “[n]ot informing a 
company of a potential fraud and waiting for the SEC to act is the equivalent of not 
calling the firefighters down the street to put out a raging fire.”107 
 
III.  Whistleblower Incentives 
The United States has a long history of encouraging whistleblowers.108 In fact, U.S. 
citizens “blow the whistle on waste, fraud, and abuse more than anywhere else in 
the world.”109 This section reviews the reasons why whistleblowing is so prevalent, 
and examines two strategies the U.S. government has used to encourage whistleb-
lowers to come forward, namely protection from employer retaliation, and financial 
incentives. 
 
A.  Definition of “Whistleblower” 
The Dodd-Frank Act formally defines a whistleblower as “any individual who pro-
vides, or 2 or more individuals acting jointly who provide, information relating to a 
violation of the securities laws to the [SEC], in a manner established, by rule or reg-
                                                                                                                                                    
 104. Edward Wyatt, S E.C. Adopts Its Revised Rules for Whistle-Blowers, DEALBOOK (May, 25, 2011, 7:52 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/05/25/s-e-c-adopts-final-rules-for-whistle-blowers/ (“The changes from the 
original proposals, which attracted 240 comments and more than 1,300 form letters, were not enough for the 
S.E.C’s two Republican commissioners, Kathleen L. Casey and Troy E. Paredes, who both voted against the 
rules.”). 
 105.   Dylan Blaylock, SEC Whistleblower Rules a Win-Win, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT (May 26, 2011), 
http://www.whistleblower.org/blog/31-2010/1135-sec-whistleblower-rules-a-win-win; see also supra note 82. 
  106.  Id. “Whistleblowers will have the choice of where to bring their evidence to maximize their effectiveness.” Id. 
The good news for whistleblowers did not end there. See id. The SEC revised the proposed rules to permit disclosures 
by auditors, compliance officers and others with similar duties. Id.; see also supra, notes 88–92. 
  107. Ashby Jones, Corporate America Not Totally Thrilled With New Whistleblower Rules, LAW BLOG (May 25, 2011, 
11:50 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/05/25/corporate-america-not-totally-thrilled-with-new-whistleblower-
rules/. 
 108. ROBERTA ANN JOHNSON, WHISTLEBLOWING: WHEN IT WORKS—AND WHY 3–23 (2003) (describing how 
and why whistleblowing is a part of the cultural landscape). 
 109. Id. at 3, 19. 
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ulation, by the [SEC].”110 This definition is both broader and narrower than pre-
vious academic definitions. 
According to whistleblower researcher Roberta Ann Johnson, “an agreed upon 
definition” of the term “whistleblower” includes four parts: 
(1) An individual acts with the intention of making information public; (2) 
the information is conveyed to parties outside the organization who make it 
public and a part of the public record; (3) the information has to do with 
possible or actual nontrivial wrongdoing in an organization; and (4) the per-
son exposing the agency is not a journalist or ordinary citizen, but a member 
or former member of the organization.111 
As discussed above, for information to be “original,” section 922(a) requires 
that it be based upon “independent knowledge” or “independent analysis.”112 There 
is no requirement that a whistleblower be “a member or former member of the or-
ganization.”113 As such, although a whistleblower is unlikely to be a journalist be-
cause of the “original information” requirement, a whistleblower under the Rule 
may be a private citizen with no formal present or past affiliation with the organiza-
tion.114 In this scenario, the “original information” is likely to be based on “inde-
pendent analysis” rather than “independent knowledge.” Of course, an analyst can 
perform “independent analysis” on an entity other than the analyst’s employer. 
Thus, Johnson’s first and third factors, but not the second and fourth, are consis-
tent with the definition set forth in section 922(a) for an eligible whistleblower.115 
And consequently, the new definition of “whistleblower” in the Dodd-Frank era 
modifies the definition for the securities context: (1) An individual acts with the in-
tention of making information public; (2) the information relates to possible or ac-
tual nontrivial wrongdoing in an organization; and (3) the information provided 
pertains to possible securities violations.116 
                                                                
 110. Dodd-Frank Act § 922(a), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 123 Stat. 1376, 1842 (2010) (to be codified at 
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6)). 
 111. JOHNSON, supra note 108, at 3–4. Professor Brian Martin has another definition: “Whistleblowing is an 
open disclosure about significant wrongdoing made by a concerned citizen, totally or predominantly motivated 
by . . . wrongdoing in a particular role and initiates the disclosure of her or his own free will to a person or agen-
cy capable of investigating the complaint and facilitating the correction of wrongdoing.” Pizzani, supra note 56, 
at 35 (quoting BRIAN MARTIN, THE WHISTLEBLOWER’S HANDBOOK: HOW TO BE AN EFFECTIVE RESISTER (1999)). 
 112. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 113. See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text. 
 114. Id.  
 115. Compare JOHNSON, supra note 108, at 3–4 with Dodd-Frank § 922(a). 
 116. Id. 
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B.  Whistleblowing in the United States 
According to Johnson, five factors explain the prevalence of whistleblowing in the 
United States: “(1) changes in the bureaucracy, (2) the wide range of laws encourag-
ing whistleblowing, (3) the federal and state whistleblower protections, (4) institu-
tional support for whistleblowers, and (5) a culture that often values whistleblow-
ing.”117 This Part will cover the first, fourth, and fifth factors, and the second and 
third factors will be discussed below. 
Does the professionalization of bureaucracies contribute to the rising number of 
whistleblowers?118 This theory suggests “[s]pecially trained experts may feel that they 
have a distinct perspective on public problems . . . , one that may be nonnegotia-
ble.”119 The theory applies most directly to the hiring of scientists and engineers to 
staff federal health, safety, and environmental protection programs.120 However, se-
curities industry professionals may feel just as compelled to report wrongdoing as 
engineers and scientists working for energy or pharmaceutical companies.121 
Do institutions in the United States encourage whistleblowing?122 News organiza-
tions, for example, help whistleblowers reach their audience.123 Johnson highlights 
two other factors that are specific to the United States: “(1) the system of divided 
government (checks and balances), and (2) the American propensity to form or-
                                                                
 117. See JOHNSON, supra note 108, at 4. 
 118. Id. at 5. 
 119. Id.  
 120. Id.  
 121. Analysts who view themselves as professionals (in the true sense of the word) are more likely to report 
misconduct. See Marshall D. Ketchum, Is Financial Analysis a Profession?, FINANCIAL ANALYSTS J., Nov.–Dec. 
1967, at 33, 33 (“(a) A profession is a higher-grade, non-manual occupation. Non-manual occupation . . . im-
plies that the intellectual, or practical, technique involved depends on a substantial theoretical foundation.”) 
(quoting a table in GEOFFREY MILLERSON, THE QUALIFIYING ASSOCIATION, A STUDY IN PROFESSIONALISM (1964)). 
“Presence, or absence, of a code of professional conduct” is not a determinative factor in determining profes-
sionalization, but it bears mentioning that in 1967 CFA charterholders were bound to a code of professional 
conduct. Id. at 34; see also Code of Ethics and Standard of Professional Conduct, CFA INST., 
http://www.cfainstitute.org/ethics/codes/ethics/Pages/index.aspx (last visited May 1, 2011) (CFA charterholders 
are still bound by a code of ethics and standards of professional conduct). For a different iteration of what it 
means to be a professional, see C. Stewart Sheppard, The Professionalization of the Financial Analyst, FINANCIAL 
ANALYSTS J., Nov.–Dec. 1967, at 39, 39 (“Webster defines a profession [as a] ‘calling requiring specialized know-
ledge and often long and intensive preparation including instruction in skills and methods as well as in the 
scientific, historical, or scholarly principles underlying such skills and methods. . . .”’). For a more recent de-
scription of professional and ethical standards, see John Howat & Linda Reid, Compensation Practices for Retail 
Sale of Mutual Funds: The Need for Transparency and Disclosure, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 685, 709–11 
(2007) (describing the professional and ethical standards of Certified Financial Planners, CFA charterholders, 
and Certified Public Accountants). 
 122. JOHNSON, supra note 108 at 10–14. 
 123. Id. at 10.  
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ganizations.”124 Johnson argues that “[a]n important way the legislative branch can 
flex its muscles vis-à-vis the executive branch is through congressional oversight of 
the executive agencies.”125 Whistleblowers often play an important role in congres-
sional hearings.126 Also amplifying the reach of whistleblowers is the flourishing of 
non-profit whistleblower groups in the United States.127 Some focus on the work of 
individual agencies,128 others on specific services.129 For instance, Taxpayers Against 
Fraud, established in 1986, specializes in False Claims Act lawsuits.130 The National 
Whistleblower Center, which emerged in the mid-1990s, offers training seminars, 
an attorney referral service, and a help line.131 The Government Accountability 
Project, created in 1977, according to Johnson, “is the most impressive whistleb-
lower organization because of its long track record and its participation as a witness 
in congressional hearings and as an expert in General Accounting Office reports.”132 
Johnson also believes that a cultural shift has taken place where society, which once 
saw whistleblowers as disloyal, now respects them as representative of the tradition-
al American value of individualism.133 
C.  Protection from Retaliation: The Failed Remedy 
As whistleblowers became more accepted in society, efforts were made to protect 
them from retribution and encourage them to come forward.134 First, lawmakers 
thought that if the government protected whistleblowers from employer retaliation, 
more whistleblowers would come forward.135 
                                                                
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 11. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. (citing the U.S. Navy Price Fighter Detachment as an example of a non-profit organization that 
serves whistleblowers). 
 128. Id. (referencing the Forest Service Employees for Environmental Ethics, the Public Employees for Envi-
ronmental Responsibility, and the National Association of Treasury Agents). 
 129. Id. at 13 (referencing Taxpayers Against Fraud, Project on Government Oversight, and Integrity Inter-
national as example of groups specializing in particular services). 
 130. Id.; see infra Part III.D for additional information on the False Claims Act. 
 131. JOHNSON, supra note 108, at 13. 
 132. Id.; see also About, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, http://www.whistleblower.org/about (last visited 
Apr. 19, 2011) (discussing the group’s history). 
 133. JOHNSON, supra note 108, at 14, 16. 
 134. See Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Do Good and Get Rich: Financial Incentives 
for Whistleblowing and the False Claims Act, 37 VILL. L. REV. 273, 273, 275–83 (1992) (discussing legislative ef-
forts in the 1980s). 
 135. See id. at 275–76 (stating that most laws focused on a remedy for when retaliation occurs). 
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The strategy failed.136 Early state statutes, mostly enacted in the 1980s, inade-
quately protected employees against retaliation.137 The remedy for the successful li-
tigant was “recovery of lost benefits and wages, and a return to the job.”138 Two as-
sumptions underlay the statutes. Lawmakers assumed that “because most 
whistleblowers suffer retaliation, potential whistleblowers are deterred from report-
ing wrongdoing.”139 And they assumed that removing that risk would encourage 
employees to blow the whistle.140 Unfortunately, that was not the case.141 Implemen-
tation was flawed. A 1987 study indicated that early state statutes were unsuccessful 
because of “legislative drafting errors and ineffective judicial interpretation.”142 
In view of the failure of previous laws, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”) 
attempted to better protect employees.143 First, SOX included the standard anti-
retaliation provision through which employees could recover damages.144 And law-
makers strengthened that provision by making retaliation against whistleblowers a 
criminal offense.145 Second, SOX “require[d] that corporations provide employees 
with a standardized channel to report organizational misconduct internally within 
the corporation.”146 
But the SOX provisions failed to protect whistleblowers.147 Professor Richard E. 
Moberly studied over 700 Department of Labor administrative decisions and found 
that only 3.6 percent of SOX whistleblowers won relief through the initial adminis-
trative process, and only 6.5 percent won appeals.148 Professor Geoffrey Christopher 
                                                                
 136. See id. at 277–78 (discussing the results of a study of the effectiveness of state anti-retaliation statutes). 
 137. Id. In addition to the state statutes, a number of federal regulatory statutes protect whistleblowers 
against retaliation. See, e.g., Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12 § 2, 103 Stat. 16 (codified 
at 5 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006)) (protecting employees who disclose government illegalities). 
 138. Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 134, at 276. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 277. 
 142. Id. at 277 n.13 (citing Terry Morehead Dworkin & Janet P. Near, Whistleblowing Statutes: Are They 
Working?, 25 AM. BUS. L.J. 241 (1987)). 
 143. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 806(a), 116 Stat. 745, 802–04 (codified at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1514A (2006)). 
 144. Id. (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c) (2006)). 
 145. See id. § 1107 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e) (2006)). 
 146. Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model To Encourage Corporate Whistleblowers, 2006 
BYU L. REV. 1107, 1109; see generally id. at 1131–61 (discussing the “structural model”). 
 147. See Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why Sarbanes-Oxley Whis-
tleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 91–99 (2007) (discussing low employee win rates); see also 
Pizzani, supra note 56, at 35 (“According to the Center for Public Integrity, since the enactment of the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act whistleblower provisions through 30 June 2010, the Department of Labor has tossed out 1,066 
claims while upholding only 25. In other words, only 2.3 percent of the claims have been successful.”). 
 148. Moberly, supra note 147 at 91. 
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Rapp describes the dire consequences whistleblowers face, including industry black-
listing, harm to future employment prospects, and social ostracism from co-
workers.149 Whistleblowers can also suffer psychological consequences, as they are 
often subject to public criticism, and they often must endure lengthy, acrimonious 
trials.150 
In the financial industry, blacklisting can be devastating.151 Securities profession-
als are often highly paid152 and their specialized skill sets may not transfer well to 
other industries.153 A successful money manager, for example, can make a high sala-
ry and bonus at a financial institution, but is generally unqualified for comparably 
paid work outside the industry.154 Conversely, professionals in brick and mortar 
businesses often have generally applicable skills.155 For example, a blacklisted phar-
maceutical sales representative might find a job selling other scientific products, or 
even automobiles. 
In some cases, however, protection from retaliation may be sufficient. Those 
who see it as a professional duty to report the information may only need the assur-
ance that they will not lose their jobs. A public accountant, upon discovering ques-
tionable revenue recognition practices during an audit, may have a professional ob-
ligation to change some language, resign the account, or under some circumstances 
make a report to the government.156 For her, blowing the whistle may be a career-
enhancing move.  
                                                                
 149. Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection: Invigorating Incentives for Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate and 
Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. REV. 91, 95 (2007). 
 150. Id. at 95–96. 
 151. See, e.g., Louise Story, A Former Moody’s Executive, in Suing Firm, Claims He Was Blacklisted, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 14, 2010, at B4 (illustrating that whistleblowing on Wall Street can result in severe blacklisting). 
 152. See Marcus Baram, Wall Street Bonuses vs. Normal Wages: A Disturbing Trend, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 
20, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/10/20/wall-street-bonuses-vs-no_n_324281.html (noting that 
in 2006 the average financial industry professional’s annual bonus was fourteen times what it was twenty-five 
years ago).   
 153. See Financial Analysts, BUREAU OF LABOR STATS. 1, http://www.bls.gov/oco/pdf/ocos301.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 19, 2011) (describing that financial analysts often focus their work on a specific industry, region, or type of 
product and obtain professional designations specific to financial services). 
 154. See Personal Financial Advisors, BUREAU OF LABOR STATS. 2, http://www.bls.gov/oco/pdf/ocos302.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 19, 2011) (identifying the salary range for the middle 50 percent of employees as up to 
$119,290 before bonuses); see also David F. Traver, Transferability of Skills: Principles and Cross Examination, 
http://jamespublishing.com/articles_forms/SocialSecurity/transfer_sk lls_principles_cross-exam.htm (last vi-
sited Apr. 19, 2011) (identifying jobs with transferable skills, such as clerical, administrative, and managerial 
jobs). 
 155. See Traver, supra note 154. 
 156. See generally Mark Grothe & Thomas R. Weirich, Analyzing Auditor Changes: Lack of Disclosure Hinders 
Accountability to Investors, CPA J. ONLINE, Dec. 2007, at http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2007/1207 
/infocus/p14.htm (discussing instances where auditors resigned from an account and where auditors required 
restatements of financials); Lynn E. Turner et al., An Inside Look at Auditor Changes, CPA J. ONLINE, Nov. 2005 
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D.  Financial Incentives to the Rescue 
Historically, financial incentives have worked well as a tool to get whistleblowers to 
come forward.157 The first such law was the False Claims Act (“FCA”),158 enacted at 
the insistence of President Lincoln in response to procurement fraud against the 
Union Army.159 The 1863 law authorized private citizens, via a qui tam160 provision, 
to sue on behalf of the government, and, if successful, collect a bounty.161 Although 
the law weakened over time, defense procurement scandals led to a strengthening of 
the FCA in 1986, when new amendments increased the chance of recovery by a qui 
tam plaintiff.162 First, they set a compensation floor to be awarded to plaintiffs in 
successful cases.163 Second, they made it easier for a plaintiff to make a successful 
claim.164 Third, they expanded the class of people who could bring claims.165 Since 
the 1986 amendments, the federal government has recovered billions under the 
FCA, with whistleblowers collecting large bounties.166 
                                                                                                                                                    
supp., at http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2005/1105/special_issue/essentials/p12.htm (discussing resigna-
tions and restatements). This may help explain the SEC’s stance towards public accountants as whistleblowers. 
See supra notes 78, 87 and accompanying text. 
 157. See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, False Claims, Not Securities Fraud: Towards Corporate Governance by 
Whistleblowers, 15 NEXUS J. OP. 55, 62 (2009), available at LexisNexis.  
 158. Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696 (1863) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33). 
 159. Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 134, at 302 & n. 112. 
 160. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1368 (9th ed. 2009) (“Latin qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac 
parte sequitur ‘who as well for the king as for himself sues in this matter’”). 
 161. Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, §§ 4, 6 (providing for a qui tam suit and a bounty of one half of the forfei-
ture and one half of the amount of damages collected). 
 162. Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 134, at 303, 305 & nn. 115 & 117 
 163. See id. at 305–07. 
 164. See id. at 305, 308–10. 
 165. Id. at 305, 310–14. 
 166. See Rapp, supra note 157, at 62. Under the FCA, “although files are sealed in U.S. federal court for sev-
en years,” the whistleblower’s identity is eventually made public. Pizzani, supra note 56, at 37. But see Posting of 
Mark Kleiman, Law Office of Mark Allen Kleiman, to whistleblowerlawlistserv@list.voicesforcorporate respon-
sibility.com (May 2, 2011, 9:46 AM PDT) (“The files are not sealed for seven years. There is an initial 60-day 
seal period (see 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2)). After that, the Department of Justice may, at its discretion, apply for 
extensions of the seal. It invariably asks for extensions until it decides to either join the case (intervention) or 
decline the case. Some cases take seven years, but those are the outliers. The vast majority are resolved in 3–4 
years.”) (on file with author and reprinted with permission); Under Dodd-Frank § 922(a), the whistleblower 
may remain anonymous if represented by counsel. Dodd-Frank Act §922(a), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 123 Stat. 
1376 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(d)(2)(A)). However, for a whistleblower to receive an award 
under the SEC program, a whistleblower or his counsel must disclose the whistleblower’s identity to the SEC. 
Id.  It is unclear when the SEC would then disclose the whistleblower’s identity to the public. See Proposed Rules, 
supra note 61, at 70,500 (describing the SEC’s duty of confidentiality with respect to whistleblower submissions 
under Proposed Rule 21F-7 and stating that “there may be circumstances in which disclosure of information 
that identifies a whistleblower will be legally required or will be necessary for the protection of investors”). Pro-
posed Rule 21F-7 is adopted largely as proposed. Final Rules, supra note 61, at 131. 
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The Insider Trading Act of 1988 was less successful than the FCA because the 
SEC awarded few bounties under the law.167 It remains to be seen whether, if the 
SEC begins awarding more bounties, more whistleblowers will come forward with 
information on insider trading. Recently, the SEC has stepped up enforcement of 
insider trading.168 However, it is unclear whether the increased enforcement is due 
to better information from whistleblowers, due to whistleblowers perceiving that 
compensation is more likely, or due to some other factor. 
Financial incentives for whistleblowers can be structured in different ways.169 
They can be fixed or contingent, large or small.170 Large incentives are significantly 
more effective than small incentives,171 and section 922(a) promises highly variable, 
and potentially enormous financial rewards.172 As noted above, at a minimum, if the 
SEC succeeds in obtaining a monetary recovery, the whistleblower is guaranteed at 
least $100,000.173 There is no dollar cap on the size of the award.174 In theory, the 
award could be in the tens of millions of dollars. Thus, there is reason to believe 
that the response under section 922(a) will be strong. 
However, the brute force of the financial incentive could be problematic if it 
leads to excessive reporting of unworthy claims. Such reporting could tax the re-
sources of the SEC, excessively burden the businesses that must respond to the 
claims, and result in a political backlash that could jeopardize agency support. Two 
                                                                
 167. See OFFICE OF AUDITS, supra note 39, at iii, 4–8 (noting that very few payments were made under the 
SEC’s bounty program); see also id. at 5 (identifying seven payments to only five claimants). 
 168. See Insider Trading, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2011), http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/ timestop-
ics/subjects/i/insider_trading/index.html (discussing the expansion of insider trading arrests in 2010 and how 
the case against Galleon Group hedge fund manager Raj Rajaratnam mushroomed into a much broader investi-
gation); see also Roben Farzad & Theo Francis, The SEC’s Tough New Offensive on Insider Trading, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 21, 2009), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/09_44 /b4153000978323.htm 
(noting a recent action against Galleon Group and signaling a bolder stance from the SEC on insider trading 
and an increased use of technology). On May 11, 2011, a jury convicted Rajaratnam on all fourteen counts of 
insider trading. Peter Lattman & Azam Ahmed, Galleon’s Rajaratnam Found Guilty, DEALBOOK (May 11, 2011, 
10:50 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/05/11/rajaratnam-found-guilty/. Rajaratnam is to be sentenced 
on July 29, 2011, when he could receive up to twenty-five years in prison. Id. 
 169. See Feldman & Lobel, supra note 62, at 1168–72 (discussing financial incentives designed to encourage 
increased reporting of organizational illegality). 
 170. Id. (differentiating between rewards available to whistleblowers). 
 171. See id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 178–95 (discussing the results of a study analyzing the 
effect of large financial rewards). 
 172. See infra notes 173–74 and text accompanying (describing the potential financial rewards ava lable to 
whistleblowers under § 922(a) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act); see also 
supra Part II.A (giving a general outline of the contents of § 922(a)). 
 173. Dodd-Frank Act § 922(a), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 123 Stat. 1376, 1841–49 (2010) (to be codified at scat-
tered sections of U.S.C.) (noting that the SEC is required to pay a whistleblower at least 10 percent of monetary 
sanctions that exceed $1,000,000). 
 174. Id. There is, however, a percentage cap at 30 percent. Id. 
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procedural tools are designed to deter false submissions.175 First, the information 
must be submitted to the SEC under penalty of perjury.176 Second, a whistleblower 
who wishes to remain anonymous must be represented by an attorney who certifies 
to the SEC that she has verified the whistleblower’s identity.177 It remains to be seen 
whether those safeguards are adequate. If not, more can be put in place. 
As to the effect of large financial rewards, a study by Professor Luigi Zingales 
and co-authors found that financial incentives motivate whistleblowers.178 Zingales 
examined fraud cases between 1996 and 2004 in U.S. companies with more than 
$750 million in assets.179 The sample included 216 cases of alleged corporate fraud, 
including Enron, HealthSouth, and WorldCom.180 Zingales found that in healthcare 
(an industry where the government is a significant source of revenue, thus making 
whistleblower suits more likely) employees brought 41 percent of the frauds to 
light.181 In other industries, employees detected only 14 percent of fraud cases.182 The 
study concluded that there is strong circumstantial evidence that significant mone-
tary incentives motivate whistleblowers.183 
Also relevant is Zingales’ evaluation of who actually detects fraud.184 Of the 216 
cases examined, employees uncovered the highest number of frauds (26, 18.3 per-
cent) followed by analysts (24, 16.9 percent).185 The media also did well (22, 15.5 
percent), as did industry regulators, government agencies (excluding the SEC), and 
self-regulatory organizations (20, 14.1 percent (one category)).186 Auditors detected 
sixteen frauds (11.3 percent).187 The SEC did poorly, finding only ten frauds (7 per-
cent).188 
                                                                
 175. Proposed Rules, supra note 61, at 70,489, 70,502–04 (discussing the procedural requirements of Pro-
posed Rule 21F-9 designed to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the SEC’s enforcement program). 
 176. Id. at 70,489, 70,502–03.  
 177. Id. at 70,489, 70,503–04. 
 178. Luigi Zingales et al., Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud? 1 (Univ. of Chicago Booth Sch. of Bus., 
Working Paper No. 08-22, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=891482. 
 179. Id. at 2. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 4. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. See id. at 9 (“[O]ur aim is to identify the initial force that starts the landslide of a scandal coming to 
light.”). 
 185. Id. at 38 (referring to Table 2: Who Detects Corporate Fraud?). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. However, this poor showing may be partially because OCIE does not examine issuers.  See supra 
note 5. The ranking of whistleblowers by size of fraud varies dramatically depending on what statistical measure 
is used (median, mean, or winsorized mean). Zingales, supra note 178, at 38–39. A winsorized mean is “[a] me-
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Zingales’ work indicates that analysts, on balance, are competent fraud detec-
tors.189 They may not identify all the largest frauds,190 but that does not mean that 
they are not capable of discovering them. One problem may be that accomplished 
analysts often work for high-tier Wall Street investment banks.191 At these banks, 
blowing the whistle to the SEC may be seen as distracting and against shareholders’ 
interest.192 And the banks certainly do not want their analysts blowing the whistle on 
their clients.193 The large banks remain extremely conflicted due to perennial tension 
between the research and investment-banking functions.194 There is also the ques-
tion of whether analysts are successful in detecting fraud because of insider tips, or 
analytical prowess.195 In any case, if big bank analysts wish to participate in the SEC 
program, they may have to leave their banks for smaller, opportunistic hedge funds 
that encourage entrepreneurial activity such as bounty hunting. They could poten-
tially even organize bounty-hunting firms devoted exclusively to detecting fraud. 
However, this would amount to a privatization of an essential SEC function.  
                                                                                                                                                    
thod of averaging that initially replaces the smallest and largest values with the observations closest to them. 
After replacing the values, a simple arithmetic averaging formula is used to calculate the winsorized mean.” 
Winsorized Mean, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/w/winsorized_mean.asp (last visited Mar. 
16, 2011). Out of the eleven categories of whistleblowers, analysts ranked third using the median measure, 
eighth using the mean measure, and second using the winsorized mean measure. Zingales, supra note 178, at 
38–39. Only employees did consistently better than analysts. Id. 
 189. Zingales, supra note 178, at 38 (noting that analysts make up a large percentage of fraud detectors in 
comparison with the others). 
 190. Id. at 39. The mean fraud the SEC uncovered resulted in more than $720 million more in settlements 
and fines than those uncovered by analysts. Id. Of course, the SEC, as a regulator, has more leverage to extract 
large settlements than private parties in securities litigation. 
 191. See id. at 20, 44 (describing how values were generated for Table 6 on page 44). 
      192.   See id. at 24 (“Not only is . . . honest behavior not rewarded by the market, . . . it is penalized.”). Banks 
may also retaliate against analysts for issuing negative reports on the companies they cover. Jesse Eisinger, For 
One Whistle-Blower, No Good Deed Goes Unpunished, PROPUBLICA (June 1, 2011, 3:19 PM), 
http://www.propublica.org/thetrade/item/for-one-whistle-blower-no-good-deed-goes-
unpunished/?utm_source=socmed&utm_medium=twitter&utm_content=tweet4&utm_campaign=jesse. When 
star analyst David Maris “put out a sell report on Biovail, a Canadian drug company," Bank of America fired 
him after coming under pressure from multiple sources. Id.  “For his success, [Maris] was sued, fired and 
stripped of compensation . . . ." Id. “[Maris] also lost access to the world of bulge-bracket Wall Street, [and] was 
shunned by some institutional investors." Id. (“Investors think they want unvarnished advice, but many don't 
truly appreciate it. Most banks don't want employees to play detective.”). 
 193. See, e.g., id. at 23–24 (finding that in 82 percent of the cases studied where an employee was the whis-
tleblower, the whistleblower either quit under duress, was fired, or had altered responsibilities at work). 
 194. See Erik Sirri, Investment Banks, Scope, and Unavoidable Conflicts of Interest, FED. RES. BANK OF 
ATLANTA ECON. REV., Fourth Quarter 2004, at  23, 23–29, available at 
http://www.frbatlanta.org/filelegacydocs/erq404_sirri.pdf. 
 195. See Zingales, supra note 178, at 20, 44 (noting that the differences seen in Table 6 may suggest that ana-
lyst revelations are credible only when coming from a reputable analyst; an alternative theory could be that re-
putable analysts receive insider tips). 
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IV. The Analyst as Bounty Hunter 
Whistleblowers who expose fraud inside their own company may suffer from dif-
ferent pressures from whistleblowers who reveal illegality at another company.196 
Part A of this section discusses the substantial costs analysts can face when they 
blow the whistle. Part B argues that the SEC should encourage analyst participation 
in the program. Part C suggests that the SEC clarify when independent analysis 
qualifies as original information.197 
A.  Harry Markopolos and the Price Analysts Pay 
In the securities industry, experienced professionals, due to their expertise, are often 
best able to identify securities law violations from the outside.198 Unfortunately, 
these whistleblowers often have much to lose when revealing financial miscon-
duct.199 The Bernard Madoff scandal illustrates this dynamic. 
Harry Markopolos, a derivatives portfolio manager, identified Madoff’s multi-
billion dollar fraud eight years before it became public.200 From 2000 to 2008, the 
SEC ignored all five of Markopolos’s detailed submissions on Madoff’s investment 
management business (separated from the legitimate broker-dealer business).201 The 
narrative in the media focused on how the SEC failed to do its job.202 Markopolos’s 
                                                                
 196. Of course, both types of whistleblowers may fear blacklisting and ostracism, depending on the culture 
of the industry. However, many of the negative connotations that haunt whistleblowers involve feelings of dis-
loyalty. See Paul E. Rossler, Comment, Running for Cover Under Sarbanes-Oxley, 41 TULSA L. REV. 573, 574 
(2006) (“Corporate cultures . . . do not tolerate dissent well, in part because of the premium placed on loyalty”). 
A whistleblower who blows the whistle on an organization other than his employer is clearly less susceptible to 
those attacks. This whistleblower also may have less to fear in the way of potential termination (though this 
author does recognize that Markopolos feared termination for his continued investigation of Madoff). See 
MARKOPOLOS, supra note 8, at 61. 
 197. This Article focuses on the experiences of outside whistleblowers (analysts) because in this author’s 
opinion the principal innovation of § 922(a) is the allowance for independent analysis. Further, other authors 
have extensively covered the experience of inside whistleblowing employees. See, e.g., MARCIA P. MICELI & JANET 
P. NEAR, BLOWING THE WHISTLE: THE ORGANIZATIONAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPANIES AND 
EMPLOYEES (1992). 
 198. See, e.g., MARKOPOLOS, supra note 8, at 35–41 (describing how Markopolos, having thirteen years of 
experience within the financial industry, began to uncover Madoff’s scheme through attempts to reverse engi-
neer Madoff’s strategy). At first, Markopolos’s bosses pushed him to market a product that could deliver returns 
similar to those alleged by Madoff. Id. at 37. 
 199. See, e.g., Zingales, supra note 178, at 23–24; see also supra notes 193, 196. 
 200. MARKOPOLOS, supra note 8, at 1–3. 
 201. Id. at 1, 3, 7 (noting the repeated warnings given to the SEC over a nine-year period and identifying 
Madoff’s separate business dealings). 
 202. See, e.g., SEC Dropped Ball on Madoff, Watchdog Finds, CBSNEWS (Sept. 2, 2009), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/09/02/business/main5282193.shtml (“The watchdog of the Securities and 
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story is a textbook example of how costs for whistleblowers can quickly multiply 
when regulators fail to listen.203 
Markopolos was uniquely situated to become the Madoff whistleblower. In the 
late 1990’s, he worked for Rampart Investment Management, a Boston asset man-
agement firm with nearly nine billion dollars under management.204 He was a quan-
titative analyst, applying mathematical methods to investing.205 Markopolos first 
heard about Madoff’s investment activities in 1999 from his marketing colleague 
Frank Casey.206 Markopolos had introduced Casey to his old friend, Tim Ng, a ju-
nior partner at Access International Advisors (“Access Group”), a hedge fund of 
funds.207 Ng informed Casey that he found a manager returning 1 to 2 percent a 
month or more net of fees.208 When Ng revealed Madoff as the manager, “[a]nyone 
who . . . worked in the stock market even for a short period of time knew that 
name. . . .”209 His company, Madoff Investment Securities LLC, was “[one of the] 
most successful broker-dealers on Wall Street.”210 Neither Casey nor Markopolos, 
however, had ever heard that Madoff also managed money.211 
Markopolos began investigating Madoff out of curiosity, as well as for profes-
sional reasons.212 He knew that if he could create a derivatives product to compete 
with Madoff, Access Group could raise a lot of money for Rampart.213 It quickly be-
came clear to him that Madoff was running the largest Ponzi scheme in history.214 
Rampart, however, was not convinced.215 As his bosses pushed him to create a 
                                                                                                                                                    
Exchange Commission has found that three agency exams and two investigations of Bernard Madoff’s business 
were incompetent, despite ample warnings of the multibillion-dollar fraud.”). 
 203. See, e.g., MARKOPOLOS, supra note 8, at 3, 7 (illustrating the costs to Markopolos, his family, and his co-
workers during the period they investigated Madoff). 
 204. Id. at 16 (noting Markopolos’s position as a derivatives portfolio manager). 
 205. Id. at 9 (explaining a quantitative analyst’s skill set). 
 206. See id. at 3, 20–21 (detailing Madoff’s investment activities). 
 207. A hedge fund of funds is a fund that does not make direct investments, but rather invests in other 
hedge funds. The purpose of such a fund (and extra layer of fees) is to smooth out returns, engage in due dili-
gence on behalf of investors, and provide diversification. See Fund of Funds, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/fundsoffunds.asp (last vis ted Apr. 19, 2011). 
 208. MARKOPOLOS, supra note 8, at 24–25. 
 209. Id. at 26. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. See id. at 33–36 (discussing Markopolos’s curiosity of Madoff and his attempts to model his strategy in 
order to understand Madoff’s success). 
 213. Id. at 36–37 (noting the pressure from his bosses to reverse engineer Madoff’s strategy to develop a 
product to deliver returns similar to Madoff’s). 
 214. See id. at 36–40 (concluding from his research that the largest hedge fund in history appeared to be a 
fraud). 
 215. Id. at 36 (describing his boss’s disbelief of Madoff running a Ponzi scheme). 
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product to compete with Madoff, Markopolos grew more frustrated.216 In the course 
of his digging, Markopolos discovered marketing material from feeder funds.217 In 
these materials, which made no mention of Madoff, Markopolos recognized Ma-
doff’s investment strategy.218 
In one pamphlet, a feeder fund described how Madoff was supposedly execut-
ing his option trades: “To provide the desired hedge the manager then sells out of 
the money OEX index call options and buys out of the money OEX index put op-
tions. The amount of calls that are sold and puts that are bought represent a dollar 
amount equal to the basket of shares purchased.”219 To an ordinary person, this is 
not a smoking gun. But to experienced options traders such as Harry Markopolos 
and his partner Neil Chelo, it was obvious that those trades would move the market: 
“You can’t do trades of that size and not be noticed.”220 Markopolos knew “there 
was in existence a total of $9 billion of OEX index put options221 on the Chicago 
Board Options Exchange . . . [and] [y]ou can realistically purchase only $1 billion of 
these, and at various times Madoff needed $3 billion to $65 billion of these options 
to protect his investments—far more than existed.”222 This “breathtaking discovery” 
was one that only a derivatives expert could readily make.223 
In the spring of 2000, Markopolos went to the SEC because he knew that Madoff 
was “a dirty player,” and wanted him “thrown out of the game.”224 Ed Manion, a 
Markopolos ally in the SEC’s Boston Regional Office, arranged the meeting.225 Mar-
kopolos suspected that if Rampart found out about this meeting, he would have 
                                                                
 216. Id. at 36–37 (describing his frustration with his boss’s insistence on creating a product to compete with 
Madoff). 
 217. Id. at 40–42. A feeder fund is a fund “that conducts virtually all of its investing through another fund 
(called the master fund).” Feeder Fund, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/feederfund.asp 
(last visited Apr. 19, 2011). 
 218. MARKOPOLOS, supra note 8, at 42. 
 219. Id. at 41. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. at 41–42. OEX put options are options to sell the S&P 100® index with American-style exercise. 
CHICAGO BOARD OPTIONS EXCHANGE, OEX® & XEO®: S&P 100® INDEX OPTIONS (2001). An option with Ameri-
can-style exercise can be exercised at any point in the option’s life. BARBARA J. ETZEL, WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD 
FINANCE AND INVESTMENT DICTIONARY 12 (1st ed. 2003); see also American Option, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/americanoption.asp (last visited Mar. 6, 2011). These are unlike Euro-
pean-style options, which an investor can only exercise at maturity. Id.  
 222. MARKOPOLOS, supra note 8, at 41–42. 
 223. See id. at 42. 
 224. Id. at 55. Markopolos originally did not seek a reward from the SEC. Id. 
 225. Id. at xiii-xiv, 61. 
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been asked to drop the investigation, and if he had persisted, it might have cost him 
his job.226 
Had the SEC merely checked whether there insufficient “options in existence to 
delta hedge227 Madoff’s long stock position,”228 the costs to Markopolos as a whis-
tleblower would have been minimal. Unfortunately, the costs to Markopolos mul-
tiplied.229 The “most chilling discovery” was that Europeans invested billions 
through offshore funds.230 To Markopolos, it “indicated that at least some of these 
funds were handling dirty . . . , untaxed money.”231 Markopolos knew that it is 
“common knowledge that offshore funds are used by . . . organized crime and the 
drug cartels that have billions of dollars and no legitimate place to invest them.”232 
Markopolos “realized that [his] life was in danger.”233 After returning from Europe, 
he “began seriously upgrading [his] home security.”234 
On December 22, 2005, at Manion’s urging, Markopolos submitted a compre-
hensive report to the SEC on Madoff, including thirty red flags.235 A Branch Chief 
(Meghan Cheung) in SEC’s New York Regional Office read the report, but failed to 
act.236 It was then that Markopolos began “carrying an airweight Model 642 Smith 
and Wesson everywhere [he] went.”237 Panicked, he applied for a firearms permit.238 
Although Markopolos was never physically injured or killed, his fear was nonethe-
less real.239 
                                                                
 226. Id. at 61. 
   227.  Delta Hedging, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/deltahedging.asp (last visited May 18, 
2011) (“An option strategy that aims to reduce (hedge) the risk associated with price movements in the underlying asset 
by offsetting long and short positions. For example, a long call position may be delta hedged by shorting the underlying 
stock. This strategy is based on the change in the premium (price of option) caused by a change in the price of the un-
derlying security. The change in premium for each basis-point change in price of the underlying is the delta and the 
relationship between the two movements is the hedge ratio.”).  
 228. MARKOPOLOS, supra note 8 at 60. 
 229. Id. at 104–09. 
 230. Id. at 104. 
 231. Id. at 105. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. at 109. 
 235. See id. at 298–332. 
 236. See id. at 138–40. 
 237. Id. at 142. 
 238. Id. at 143. 
 239. Id. at 145 (“If [Madoff] contacted me and threatened me, I was going to drive down to New York and 
take him out. At that point it would have come down to him or me . . . In that situation I felt I had no other 
options. I was going to kill him.”); see also id. at 6 (Markopolos relieved [and unharmed] when Madoff is 
caught). 
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The SEC should consider such costs when exercising its discretion under sec-
tion 922(a). And, when dealing with external whistleblowers of Markopolos’s cali-
ber, the SEC should broadly interpret the terms “analysis” and “original informa-
tion.” Investment analysts are accustomed to using mosaic theory240 in their 
investment decisions, even when most of the information they use is public.241 It 
may be appropriate to use a stricter definition of “analysis” with whistleblowers 
who are not bona-fide professional analysts. But in determining who qualifies for 
the broader use of the term, the SEC can look to professional designations, such as 
the CFA242 and CAIA243 charters. The SEC should also consider whether the whis-
tleblower is engaged in the type of activity that she is investigating. For instance, 
Markopolos was a derivatives portfolio manager, and therefore uniquely qualified 
to use mosaic theory to draw conclusions about another derivatives manager.244 
Finally, when the SEC ignores whistleblowers that are later vindicated, the 
agency should consider giving such whistleblowers the highest possible financial 
reward. As seen from Markopolos’s story, the consequences can escalate exponen-
tially when the whistleblower loses faith in the system after being ignored. The ex-
perience of SOX has shown that protection against retaliation from employers is 
not enough to offset the cost of whistleblowing.245 Some may argue that Markopolos 
                                                                
 240. Mosaic Theory, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/mosaictheory.asp (last visited 
Apr. 19, 2011) (“A method of analysis used by security analysts to gather information about a corporation. Mo-
saic theory involves collecting public, non-public and non-material information about a company in order to 
determine the underlying value of the company's securities and to enable the analyst to make recommendations 
to clients based on that information. . . . Some see this style of analysis as a misuse of insider information, but 
the CFA Institute (formerly known as AIMR) has recognized mosaic theory as a valid method of analysis. How-
ever, analysts using this method should disclose the details of the information and methodology they used to 
arrive at their recommendation.”). 
 241. See MARKOPOLOS, supra note 8, at 298; see also id. at 306–21. 
 242. CFA Institute awards the Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) designation to those who pass three levels 
of examinations and have four years of qualifying work experience. Becoming a Member, CFA INST., 
http://www.cfainstitute.org/about/membership/process/Pages/index.aspx (last visited Mar. 5, 2011). 
 243. “The Chartered Alternative Investment Analyst program provides individuals w th the core competen-
cies required to create, manage, and monitor an institutional-quality portfolio consisting of both traditional 
and alternative investments.” CAIA Program, CHARTERED ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT ANALYST ASSOC., 
http://caia.org/caia-program (last visited Mar. 5, 2011). 
 244. MARKOPOLOS, supra note 8, at 298. 
 245. See Nina Schichor, Does Sarbanes-Oxley Force Whistleblowers to Sacrifice Their Reputations? An Argu-
ment for Granting Whistleblowers Non-Pecuniary Damages, 8 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 272, 293–95 (2008) (noting 
that SOX provides insufficient incentives as shown by the regret felt by the majority of whistleblowers for blow-
ing the whistle as well as the emotional and financial losses whistleblowers have suffered due to their civic ac-
tions); see 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c) (2006) for the SOX anti-retaliation remedies. 
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received a windfall from his celebrity status after testifying before the U.S. Senate.246 
But that view does not account for the fact that he suffered for nine years, sacrificed 
his career, and feared for the welfare of his family. 
When whistleblowers are taken seriously, the costs are less severe. The imple-
mentation does not take these costs seriously enough. The factor in final Rule 21F-6 
that permits the SEC to consider these costs is buried among many other factors 
that the SEC may or may not use to determine the size of the award.247 If the finan-
cial benefit is to compensate the whistleblower, the government should consider all 
surrounding circumstances, including the perspective and experience of the whis-
tleblower. 
In determining the total costs to the whistleblower, the SEC should consider 
both monetary and non-monetary consequences.248 If Wall Street blackballs an ana-
lyst for exposing a fraud to the SEC, the analyst will have suffered quantifiable dam-
ages by the time the bounty is awarded. The analyst could decide to pursue less re-
munerative (albeit possibly less stressful) work in the future that could increase his 
cost over the long term. The analyst may also suffer fear, loss of reputation, loss of 
self-esteem, and loss of social status. Some of these non-monetary costs, particularly 
loss of reputation, can be monetized.249 The act of whistleblowing can deprive the 
analyst of his most valuable asset—reputation. Further, the analyst may need men-
tal health services to recuperate from the trauma of losing colleagues, friends, social 
status, and self esteem. If the SEC is required to weigh these costs, it will make a bet-
ter-informed decision as to the appropriate size of a bounty. 
Although Markopolos’s experience illustrates the need to consider whistleb-
lower experiences, his case is unique. Normally, when an investment analyst uncov-
ers wrongdoing in a company, she will recommend investors sell shares of the com-
pany (or sell short250 if the investor wishes to create a short position and shares are 
                                                                
 246. See Andrew Clark, The Man Who Blew the Whistle on Bernard Madoff, GUARDIAN (Mar. 24, 2010), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/mar/24/bernard-madoff-whistleblower-harry-markopolos (stating 
that Markopolos is “clearly relishing elements of his new-found notoriety”). 
 247. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 248. At least one author has made this argument on behalf of whistleblowers. See, e.g., Schichor, supra note 
245, at 292–95 (arguing that SOX whistleblowers should receive non-pecuniary damages). 
 249. See Bryan Eisenberg & Jeffrey Eisenberg, Is Your Reputation Worth $15 Billion?, FORBES (Feb. 6, 2008), 
http://www.forbes.com/2008/02/06/facebook-marketing-reputation-oped-cx_bje_0206facebook.html (stating 
that individuals’ reputations as customers who can recommend products and services through word-of-mouth 
can be monetized); see also What Price Reputation?, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 9, 2007),  
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/07_28/b4042050.htm (stating that both corporate reputation 
and image changes in specific areas can be used to predict the effect on share prices). 
 250. “[A] short sale is the sale of a security that isn’t owned by the seller, but that is promised to be deli-
vered.” Short Selling, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/university/shortselling/shortselling1.asp (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2011). 
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available to borrow).251 Here, because there is no way to take a short position in a 
Ponzi scheme, Markopolos could not use the market to correct the imbalance.252 
Section 922(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act takes a step in the right direction by recog-
nizing that “independent analysis” can be just as valuable to the SEC in prosecuting 
securities violations as “independent knowledge.” However, the agency needs to 
take this thinking a step further and fully embrace the role of analysts in ferreting 
out wrongdoing. 
B.  The SEC Should Encourage Analyst Participation 
Politicians, investors, and business executives make a sport of criticizing short sel-
lers, contending that they disrupt the market.253 However, short selling “is a legiti-
mate economic activity that enhances market efficiency and liquidity and shapes 
prices to reflect the investment views of investors that do not own the stock in ques-
tion.”254 Although the United States and United Kingdom have generally been care-
ful not to impose restrictions that go beyond the purpose of avoiding market mani-
pulation,255 the SEC has occasionally scapegoated short-sellers.256 For instance, the 
SEC recently imposed circuit breakers on stocks that fall 10 percent in one day.257 
When that happened, short sellers can only execute a transaction at a price above 
the best bid.258 By contrast, long-only institutional investors, who often have more 
power to move markets downwards or upwards, were exempted from any sales re-
strictions.259  
                                                                
 251. See, e.g., Christopher Mayer, Stock Market Scams, MISES DAILY (June 6, 2001), 
http://mises.org/daily/696/Stock-Market-Scams (book review of MANUEL P. ASENSIO, SOLD SHORT: 
UNCOVERING DECEPTION IN THE MARKETS (2001) (describing short selling process and associated scams)). 
 252. MARKOPOLOS, supra note 8, at 89. 
 253. Sadakazu Osaki, The Folly of Demonizing Short-selling, LAKYARA, Jan. 10, 2009, at 1, 3, available at 
http://www.nri.co.jp/english/opinion/lakyara/2009/pdf/lkr200948.pdf. 
 254. Id. at 2. 
 255. See id. 
 256. Christopher A. Stanley, The Panic Effect: Possible Unintended Consequences of the Temporary Bans on 
Short Selling Enacted During the 2008 Financial Crisis, 4 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 267, 282–83 (2010); Michael 
Comeau, SEC’s New Restrictions Scapegoat Short Sellers, MINYANVILLE (Feb. 24, 2010, 1:35 PM), 
http://www.minyanville.com/articles/print.php?a=26998. 
 257. Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech by SEC Chairman: Statement at SEC Open 
Meeting—Short Sale Restrictions, (Feb. 24, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch022410mls-
shortsales.htm. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. 
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But some short sellers see themselves as the “de facto enforcement division of 
the SEC.”260 And why shouldn’t the SEC embrace market players, including short 
sellers, as fraud finders? Mostly, investment managers engaged in these activities 
will have “skin in the game,”261 which is the way it should be. However, the question 
arises whether the SEC should penalize these individuals simply because they are 
professional investors. The fear is that awarding bounties to investment managers 
amounts to ‘double dipping’ because they would benefit not only from the govern-
ment award, but also from market movement in their portfolios.262 Most analysts 
looking for fraud are also engaged in some professional capacity within the financial 
industry and owe certain duties to their clients.263 However, if analysts are honest 
and recommend that investors sell shares when they uncover irregularities, and if 
they report their findings to the SEC, their interests are aligned with, rather than in 
opposition to, their clients’ interests.264 Just because many potential outside whis-
tleblowers are employed as analysts, the SEC should not disqualify these individuals 
on a technicality in the rules. The SEC should enlist smart analysts on Wall Street by 
offering them the prospect of a bounty under section 922(a). 
Despite some obstacles, the text of section 922(a) does not preclude such a re-
sult. The section defines whistleblower as “any individual who provides, or 2 or 
more individuals acting jointly who provide, information relating to a violation of 
the securities laws to the [SEC]. . . .”265 The Act even provides a list of those prec-
luded from collecting an award: hedge funds and short sellers are not on the list.266 If 
the whistleblower of the future is not Markopolos, but rather a “boring hedge fund 
money-making machine looking to collect a government reward,” the policy could 
yield substantial enforcement dividends.267 Nonetheless, the SEC will have to con-
                                                                
 260. Jesse R. Morton, (Commentary) Whistleblower Bounties: Can Hedge Funds Double Dip Under Dodd-
Frank?, WESTLAW BUS. CURRENTS (Jan. 11, 2011) (citing DAVID EINHORN, FOOLING SOME OF THE PEOPLE ALL OF 
THE TIME: A LONG SHORT STORY 355 (2009)).  
 261. “Skin in the game” is a term renowned investor Warren Buffett coined “referring to a situation in 
which high-ranking insiders use their own money to buy stock in the company they are running.” Skin in the 
Game, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/skininthegame.asp (last visited Mar. 5, 2011). In 
the investment management industry, the term is used when a money manager invests his own money with the 
fund he manages. See id. 
 262. See id. 
 263. See generally Amy Y. Yeung & Kristen J. Freeman, Gartenberg, Jones, and the Meaning of Fiduciary: A 
Legislative Investigation of Section 36(B), 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 483 (2010) (examining the history of the fiduciary 
duty standard as applied to investment advisers). 
 264. Id. 
 265. Dodd-Frank Act § 922(a), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 123 Stat. 1376, 1843 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78u-6(a)(6)). 
 266. Id.  
 267. Morton, supra note 260. 
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front the risk that the public will see such bounties as evidence of the agency’s collu-
sion with Wall Street.268 The SEC can only overcome this risk if it harnesses the 
market’s power to uncover large frauds. 
To understand the obstacles an analyst or hedge fund may face in collecting a 
government bounty, it is helpful to consider the Einhorn case. On March 15, 2002, 
David Einhorn, the Founder and President of the hedge fund Greenlight Capital 
(“Greenlight”), gave a speech at a charity event in which he disclosed potential ac-
counting irregularities and fraud269 at the company Allied Capital Corporation (“Al-
lied”).270 After the speech, there was a large market sell-off, and Greenlight, which 
held a substantial short position in Allied, stood to profit immensely.271 Could Ein-
horn have collected a bounty under section 922(a)? We must consider several is-
sues. 
The main obstacle an analyst or hedge fund will face in qualifying for a bounty 
is whether the SEC deems the information original.272 In this case, Einhorn based his 
analysis on “independent analysis of publicly available information.”273 The SEC de-
finition of “original information” explicitly allows for “independent analysis.”274 
Less clear is how the SEC will interpret the phrase “not known to the [SEC] from 
any other source.”275 As discussed above, the SEC conceded that there are circums-
tances where individuals analyzing public information can assist the SEC and be eli-
gible for a bounty.276 Unfortunately, the SEC provided no more detail.277 Thus, the 
                                                                
 268. Id. (suggesting that some market players feel short sellers are the “de facto enforcement division of the 
SEC”). 
 269. The substance of the allegations were the following: (1) “Allied did not mark its investments to fair 
value . . . which was in direct disagreement with SEC requirements . . . ;” (2) “Allied refused to provide adequate 
disclosure over the performance of several of its controlled investments;” (3) Allied’s largest investment was 
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. . .”  Id. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. Allied was an investment company regulated under the Investment Advisors Act of 1940. Id. In 
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 272. See Morton, supra note 260. 
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   274.  Supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 275. Dodd-Frank Act § 922(a), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 123 Stat. 1376, 1841–42 (2010) (to be codified at 
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(3)(B)). 
 276. See supra Part II.B.1; see also supra notes 71–75 and accompanying text. 
 277. See supra notes 71–75 and accompanying text. 
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potential analyst whistleblower is uncertain as to when she is entitled to a payout. 
Analysts may perceive the deck unfairly stacked against them in making a claim. 
Securities law violations, like deceptive accounting practices, are often difficult 
for non-experts to identify.278 Even Dick Fuld, the former Chief Executive Officer of 
Lehman Brothers, claimed that he did not know about Repo 105,279 an accounting 
maneuver that allowed Lehman to appear as if it were borrowing less than it was.280 
The law does not expressly favor those who have “knowledge” of violations over 
those who apply analysis.281 But without more specificity, the uncertainty remains as 
to when an analyst using public information will qualify for an award. This lack of 
certainty amounts to a built-in disadvantage for the analyst. It is also noteworthy 
that much of the hedge-fund-generated whistleblower allegations will likely be 
based on information in SEC filings, which by definition are known to the agency.282 
Thus, analysts in this situation will not be able to claim they were using public in-
formation unknown to the SEC. That may hurt the analyst’s case on the margins. 
Another obstacle an analyst may face lies under Rule 21F-2, Definition of a 
Whistleblower: “[a] whistleblower must be a natural person; a company or another 
entity is not eligible to receive a whistleblower award.”283 Although this requirement 
appears to be relatively straightforward, it may not be strictly applied.284 First, sec-
tion 922(a) “was modeled on the FCA, which does not narrow a whistleblower to 
only a natural person.”285 Second, the Act provides that “a whistleblower can appeal 
an SEC determination regarding payment of an award. The section . . . states that 
‘[a]ny determination . . . including whether, to whom, or in what amount to make 
                                                                
 278. See, e.g., Zachery Kouwe, Dick Fuld Has Never Heard of Repo 105, DEALBREAKER (Apr. 16, 2010, 4:15 
PM), http://dealbreaker.com/2010/04/dick-fuld-has-never-heard-of-repo-105/. 
 279. Id. Repo 105 was a transaction where Lehman put assets over to client companies in exchange for cash. 
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Jacob Goldstein, Repo 105: Lehman’s ‘Accounting Gimmick’ Explained, PLANET MONEY BLOG (Mar. 12, 2010, 
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 280. Goldstein, supra note 279. 
 281. Dodd-Frank Act § 922(a), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 123 Stat. 1376 (2010) (defining “original information” 
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 282. Morton, supra note 260. 
 283. Final Rules, supra note 61, at 9, 14–15; see also Proposed Rules, supra note 61, at 70,489; Morton, supra 
note 260. 
 284. See Morton, supra note 260 (stating that “a hedge fund could theoretically succeed in spite of the pro-
posed rule”). But see Final Rules, supra note 61, at 14 (“We have decided not to extend the definition of whis-
tleblower beyond natural persons because we believe that this is consistent w th the statutory definition which 
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 285. Morton, supra note 260. 
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awards, shall be in the discretion of the [SEC] . . . .’”286 Further, “such determina-
tion, except the determination of the amount of an award . . . may be appealed to 
the appropriate court of appeals . . . [.]”287 Thus, it may be possible to sidestep the 
requirement if the manager acts as the whistleblower in his personal capacity to col-
lect the award.288 The manager and the shareholders of the fund could have an 
agreement governing how much of the award the manager would pay into the fund 
for the benefit of the shareholders. In the end, the fund could benefit from the 
manager’s whistleblowing activity. Such a maneuver would empower fund manag-
ers to report wrongdoing to the SEC without worrying about the perception that 
the bounty constituted secret profits, possibly in violation of the corporate oppor-
tunity doctrine.289 
C.  The SEC Should Clarify When “Independent Analysis” Qualifies for a Bounty 
Section 922(a), by allowing for the possibility of “independent analysis” as a basis 
for “original  information,” took the correct first step in recognizing that whistleb-
lower cases are not always clear cut.290 Although one can hope that the next great 
financial fraud will be uncovered by someone with perfect knowledge, it is more 
likely that someone like Harry Markopolos or David Einhorn will detect the first 
signs and put the puzzle together using a smattering of public and non-public 
sources. 
The SEC has an opportunity to administer section 922(a) in a way that aligns 
the interests of Wall Street and society. Unfortunately, while Rule 21F recognizes 
that there are circumstances where independent analysis of public documents 
would warrant an award, it also details six exclusions where the SEC would not 
deem the information original.291 By writing the rules in this way, the SEC lost an 
opportunity to specify fact patterns when “independent analysis” would qualify.292  
                                                                
 286. Id.; Dodd-Frank Act § 922(a). 
 287. Dodd-Frank Act § 922(a); see also Proposed Rules, supra note 61, at 70,508 (describing the procedure 
for administrative appeals). 
 288. There may be laws or regulations that would prevent investment advisers from receiving a bounty from 
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but not giving any specific examples); Proposed Rules, supra note 61, at 70,492 (merely stating that “independent 
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Greater clarity is necessary. First, any whistleblower program that pays bounties 
to employees of regulated entities will be subject to a high level of media scrutiny.293 
If the SEC is seen as capricious or inconsistent in its awards, the agency will be ex-
posed to charges of industry capture. The SEC is already highly vulnerable to such 
criticism because of the perception that it offers a revolving door to employees eager 
to work for a regulated entity.294 
Second, it is well known that many financial industry professionals show little 
respect for the SEC.295 The SEC needs credibility not only with the public, but also 
with the rank-and-file of regulated entities.296 If there is widespread buy-in from 
hedge fund and bank analysts on the fairness and effectiveness of the whistleblower 
program, analysts will likely come forward with valuable information. 
Third, to the extent that information in public SEC filings is not fully incorpo-
rated into prices by the market,297 section 922(a) can encourage analysts to use their 
talents to more energetically sift through filings and uncover deceptive practices. 
The case of In re Merck & Co., Inc. Securities Litigation298 suggests that markets often 
do not digest information in SEC filings, even when analysts are supposedly perus-
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ing them.299 In that case, Merck had planned an initial public offering of its wholly 
owned subsidiary Medco Health Solutions (“Medco”), a pharmacy benefits manag-
er.300 Issues arose with Medco’s revenue recognition practices.301 Even though Medco 
never handled co-payments, “it interpreted the accounting standards to allow it to 
recognize the co-payments as revenue.”302 Merck disclosed for the first time on its 
April 17, 2002 Form S-1 that Medco “had recognized as revenue the co-payments 
paid by consumers, but it did not disclose the total amount of co-payments recog-
nized.”303 The stock price stayed stable until June 21, 2002, when The Wall Street 
Journal estimated that in 2001 Medco wrongly recognized $4.6 billion304 in co-
payments as revenue.305 The market immediately reacted: “that day Merck’s stock 
lost $2.22—dropping from $52.20 to $49.98.”306 Then “[s]ix days later, Merck an-
nounced the postponement of the Medco IPO and indicated that it would drop 
Medco’s offering price.”307 Merck filed its fourth S-1 on July 5, 2002, finally disclos-
ing that Medco had recognized over $12.4 billion in co-payments as revenue from 
1999 to 2001.308 
How did the reporter arrive at the $4.6 billion estimate for 2001? She made one 
assumption and performed “one subtraction and one multiplication on the infor-
mation contained in the April S-1.”309 She then “determined the number of retail 
prescriptions filled (462 million) by subtracting home-delivery prescriptions filled 
(75 million) from total prescriptions filled (537 million).”310 She then multiplied the 
number of prescriptions by $10 to get $4.6 billion.311 
The issue in Merck was whether the mathematics the reporter performed to un-
derstand the disclosure rendered it void.312 In holding that it did not, the court re-
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lied on its opinion in Ash v. LFE Corp.,313 where a proxy statement disclosed direc-
tors’ current pension amounts, and in another section the newly proposed 
amounts, but did not disclose the sum of the increase.314 In that case, the court held 
that as long as the “facts [were] disclosed prominently and candidly,” requiring 
readers to make a simple subtraction does not constitute a material omission.315 Be-
cause the calculation necessary to make the Merck disclosure meaningful involved 
an assumption and multiplication, instead of simple subtraction, the case can be 
read as extending the holding in Ash that companies are not required to spoon feed 
analysts with answers, as long as the disclosures are clear. 
In both of these cases, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
showed a willingness to allow companies to make “clear” disclosures that still hide 
their true significance.316 Had the court taken the opposite view, requiring compa-
nies to make those calculations explicit, the SEC might be justified in believing that 
the market would digest the information in SEC filings. If the market absorbs the 
full import of the information, then it is truly “public” and analysts are less valuable 
in the information gathering process and as whistleblowers. Notwithstanding the 
court’s faith in efficient markets, analysts still play a vital role. 
V. Conclusion 
The SEC has an opportunity to improve its efficiency.317 To do so, the agency must 
harness the potential of analysts and money managers on Wall Street by compensat-
ing them fairly through the whistleblower program.318 In reality, Wall Street em-
ployees will often lack “independent knowledge” of securities violations.319 Howev-
er, they can often deduce fraud through “independent analysis” of SEC filings and 
other public sources.320 
The rules governing when “independent analysis” constitutes “original infor-
mation” are imperfect. Although the SEC does not categorically exclude analysis 
(and analysts) from qualifying under the program, it is unfortunate that the agency 
focuses on the value of the information to the government, while not adequately 
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considering the real costs to whistleblowers.321 Securities professionals who become 
whistleblowers are likely to experience severe costs and consequences, as the Mar-
kopolos story indicates.322 Unfortunately, the SEC issued final Rule 21F-6 without a 
requirement to consider costs to whistleblowers in bounty-size analyses.323 The SEC, 
of course, is free to place as much weight on those costs as it desires.324 Hopefully, 
the SEC will recognize that uncompensated costs are the principal reason whistleb-
lowers do not come forward.325 This reality calls for a greater focus on those costs.  
Research indicates that analysts are highly competent fraud detectors.326 The 
SEC should recognize their expertise and refrain from applying the regulations in a 
way that unfairly burdens them.327 The agency needs allies in the fight against 
fraud.328 When analysts are willing to risk their careers for justice, the SEC should 
make every attempt to compensate them for their trouble. 
Further, the SEC should not discourage money managers who short stocks and 
then seek to collect a bounty.329 The agency should permit these managers to enter 
into agreements with their shareholders governing the distribution of bounties, and 
to collect them as “natural persons.”330 Last, the SEC should clarify the circums-
tances where “analysis” is deemed “original information,” and take a liberal ap-
proach that values analysis as much, or nearly as much, as actual knowledge.331 
Thus, the SEC could go a long way towards convincing stakeholders that the whis-
tleblower program is credible and beneficial to the financial system.332 
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